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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a detailed examination of the market
conditions and development options available for the Lincoln
Wharf Development, a luxury residential development on
Boston's downtown waterfront. In August of 1985, the Kenney
Development Company will be designated the developer for the
2.36-acre waterfront site by Boston's Public Facilities
Department. The site is currently composed of two old piers,
Lincoln Wharf and the North Ferry Pier. The thesis addresses
the development and rehabilitation of the first phase of the
two-phase development - Lincoln Wharf and the abandoned coal
pocket storage structure on the wharf, which will house the
development. While arduous negotiations with the City have
delayed the project and many legal and physical constraints
currently surround the development, the thesis addresses the
question now confronting the developer: what constitutes a
luxury residential development in this market and how should
the development effort efficiently respond to this market,
while at the same time maximizing profits and minimizing
risks.
The question is answered through a brief review of the
existing legal and physical constraints. This is followed by
an examination of the market conditions and market context in
which the development finds itself. From this analysis,
conclusions are drawn regarding pricing strategies, unit
size, unit mix and distribution. Based on this analysis and
on the physical and legal constraints, four fundamental
development considerations are addressed. The first addresses
the addition of two floors on the existing structure. The
second addresses the internal organization and layout of the
building. The third consideration addresses the question of
whether to provide unfinished or finished condominiums to the
market. Finally, the provision of some form of concierge
service is addressed. The thesis then concludes with a
market plan and a review of Lincoln Wharf's relative
relationship to comparable developments in Boston.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Assistant Professor of Planning and Real Estate
Development
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INTRODUCTION
In his last day in office in December 1983, Mayor White of
Boston designated Robert Kenney of the Kenney Development
Company as the developer for two of the last three piers on
the downtown Boston waterfront. Since then arduous
negotiations have delayed the project which has only just
received preliminary approval from the Boston Redevelopment
Authority. The site consists of 100,000 square feet of piers
and water located on the harbor side of the Alantic Avenue
Power Station, immediately adjacent to Union Wharf in
Boston's North End. The designated development provides for
44 units of luxury condominiums built within the abandoned
coal storage bunker on Lincoln Wharf and followed by a second
phase of 18 units of luxury condominiums on the North
Ferry Pier, just north of Lincoln Wharf. In addition, the
development includes facilities for the Boston fireboats, a
public park and a marina.
In the eyes of the developer and many of the residents now
living on the waterfront, Lincoln Wharf and the North Ferry
Pier represent one of the last great opportunities to create
a truly spectacular residential development within the heart
of Boston. Part of an established and prestigious
neighborhood, this development is surrounded by downtown
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Boston, the financial district, the Government Center, North
Station, the Faneuil Hall Marketplace and the historic North
End. At the same time, located at the end of Battery Street,
both piers are far from the busy activity of Commercial
Street and the city and share an almost unequalled intimacy
with the harbor.
The image of this development is distinguished from its
predecessors in the neighborhood, in that it will not have
an exposed "brick and beam" look, but one of a higher degree
of sophistication and refinement while retaining the historic
waterfront character. Because of the size of the existing
structure and the legal constraints, this development will be
smaller than those built over the past ten years. The image
of the development will play upon this relatively small size
by emphasizing an overall quality of intimacy and
underplayed elegance.
While many aspects of the development are dictated by the
existing constraints both from the site and the city, the
developer is still confronted with a number of key questions
which require his immediate attention before he can
effectively proceed: what and where is the market for top-
of-the-line luxury condominiums, what amenities and services
are expected or should be provided, should the condominiums
be finished or unfinished, what management considerations are
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involved in providing unfinished units, what should the unit
sizes be, how does the existing coal storage bunker restrict
development opportunities, what can the units be sold for,
and finally, what distinguishes this development from all
others? In other words, in order to maximize profits and
minimize risks, the developer seeks to identify and respond
to the market, as efficiently as possible. It is this
question that this thesis addresses.
Because of limitations in time and in order to take
advantage of the two-phased project, the aforementioned
questions address only Lincoln Wharf. Once the first phase,
Lincoln Wharf, is complete and the market actually tested,
then the developer plans to pay closer attention to the
North Ferry Pier. The proforma for Lincoln Wharf, however,
does consider a proportionate share of the costs for the
publicly mandated contributions, most of which are to be
built in the second phase.
In an effort to answer the question addressed by this
thesis, an analysis has been conducted through the use of
interviews with brokers and prospective buyers and by
examining current supply and anticipated supply within the
project's market range. The results of this research provide
an approximation of the supply and demand conditions which
form the basis on which the thesis question is to be
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answered. All of the questions, however, bear directly on all
aspects of the development and therefore will be looked upon
in such light. Financial, legal, design and physical as well
as market constraints will be fully considered in the
evaluation of each development option.
This thesis does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis
of both supply and demand conditions. Beyond the limitations
of time, (which has inhibited the use of systematic surveys
such as direct mailings or the use of focus groups) the
modest size of the development is such that it is impossible
to use statistical models in analysing market conditions.
What the research does provide is an approximation of market
conditions based on conversations with brokers and a number
of residents and an examination of the sale histories of
comparable developments within the specific market area.
While a number of questions have ready answers, others are
complex and require more extensive examination. It is not the
intent of this thesis to answer all, or even a few, of the
hundreds of decisions required in such a development. Rather,
the intent is to draw conclusions about the major design and
marketing decisions in the fullest context of the development
effort. These conclusions will serve to direct the work of
different members of the development team such as the
architect, engineer and marketing consultant.
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What emerges from this analysis are five general types
of insights: (1) conclusions about who consititutes the
market and what their expectations are; (2) conclusions as
to how the developer should "position"/image the project; (3)
conclusions about how pricing strategies, unit size, unit mix
and distribution are made; (4) conclusions regarding the
building's internal organization, the degree of finish
required for the condominium units and whether some form of
concierge service should be provided; (5) finally,
conclusions about a market plan and the development's
relative position to comaparable projects.
Chapter One introduces the development entity and the
current legal and physical constraints of the site. Chapter
Two assesses the market conditions both within the specific
market area and Boston. From this assessment, conlusions are
made regarding absorption and a pricing strategy for Lincoln
Wharf. Chapter Three examines, in detail, the design program
and the physical design and financial feasibility issues
confronting this luxury residential development in an
existing structure. Chapter Four reviews the conclusions
drawn in Chapters Two and Three and then proceeds to
establish a market plan. This thesis is concluded by a review
of the Lincoln Wharf's relative position in respect to other
comparable developments in Boston.
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CHAPTER 1
THE DEVELOPER AND PROJECT CONSTRAINTS
The following chapter introduces the development entity
and the current legal and physical constraints which define
and direct the development effort. While some of these issues
do not bear directly on the design and marketing of the
development, they provide the background necessary to
understand the development effort as a whole and are
therefore briefly reviewed below.
The Developer
The Kenney Development Company was founded in 1977, under
the name of Urban Consulting Associates of Boston, by Robert
T. Kenney, the former director of the Boston Redevelopment
Authority and the Boston Public Facilities Department. In
1981, John Weis joined the company after serving as the
director of Boston's Neighborhood Development Agency.
Initially a consulting firm, which worked on matters of
financial placement, market analysis, development management
and project coordination, the company moved its focus to real
estate development. While still providing consulting services
on a wide range of real estate matters, the Kenney
Development Company is currently the general partner for
$60,000,000 worth of projects either currently in
construction or in the design stage. These projects range
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from a $10,000,000 office condominium complex in the
Charlestown Naval Yard to a $25,000,000 residential
condominium development in Newburyport, Massachusetts.
Th. -Ownership Entity:
Lincoln Wharf Associates was formed in the fall of 1983 as
a development entity whose sole purpose was to achieve
designation and development rights for Lincoln Wharf and the
North Ferry Pier. Composed of two general partners, the
Kenney Development Company and the Harbour Capital Group,
Lincoln Wharf Associates is currently structured as an
equally owned partnership. For the purposes of raising
capital, in addition to that provided by Harbour Capital
Group, this partnership currently plans to sell a 10% share
of its interests to a limited partner for $1,000,000.
The Harbour Capital Group is an investment firm which, for
the past ten years, has placed monies primarily in
residential real estate in New Jersey, New York and Florida.
For Lincoln Wharf Associates, the Harbour Capital Group is
providing equity financing and maintaining a passive non-
management relationship to the development.
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Current Project Constraints
Two types of constraints are found in this project. The
first are those presented by the site itself. This includes
design constraints and increased construction costs from
the deteriorated condition of the wharf. The second regards
the legal constraints with both the city and the state.
Physical Constraints
The five story heavy-timber coal pocket structure on
Lincoln Wharf stands on a creosote-imbedded timber deck
supported by 1,000 wood piles driven into the bottom of
Boston Harbor. Just below these wood piles, encased in Boston
Blue Clay, is Sumner Tunnel with the adjacent Callahan
Tunnel. This is shown in Exhibit 1, as well as a project
location map and site map. The tidal movement of the harbor
waters has rotted many of the wood piles at the waterline
and they need to be recapped. While the coal pocket storage
structure has held many tons of coal over the past years, a
plan to rehabilitate the structure and to recap the piles
has required extensive consultation with the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority, the agency responsible for the tunnels.
An approved solution has been reached which provides for the
recapping of 350 piles with loading requirements not to
exceed a specified amount. The cost of this work has been
estimated as $973,000 by the Gilbane Construction Company of
10
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Exhibit 1
PROPOSED SITE
LINCOLN WNARF ASSOCIATEE0
LINCOLN WHARF
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Providence, Rhode Island. Other significant costs to be
incurred in the rehabilitation of this structure and wharf
include the demolition of portions of the deck and the
removal of the roof, siding and other miscellaneous items on
the coal pocket structure. This work results in demolition
costs of $461,000. The total cost of this work is $1,434,000
or 22% of the total construction budget. A summary of
construction costs and their relative relationships for the
Lincoln Wharf Development may be found in Table 1.
In addition to these costs, the ten-foot-on-center
structural bays that cross the width of the coal pocket
structure and the heavy-timber diagonal bracing raise
significant design constraints in the arrangement of the
residential units. The use of steel angles will mitigate the
problem created by the diagonal bracing, but altering the
structural bays would be cost prohibitive, as it would
require the rebuilding of the entire structure. This issue is
considered in detail in Chapter Four. Photographs of the coal
pocket storage structure may be seen in Exhibit 2.
Legal Constraints
A host of issues have surrounded this development over
the one and one-half years since the original designation.
Many of these issues have been resolved through extended and,
at times, arduous negotiations with Boston's new mayor,
14
CN
4-) LO)
r1i
Exhibit 2
I -
0 1 1
iiP
16
Raymond Flynn, and the Boston Redevelopment Authority. The
agreed upon constraints and conditions for development are
described below. One central issue, the establishment of
clear title to the land, remains outstanding and bears
directly on the success of the entire development.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is responsible for all
tidelands held in the public trust. These tidal lands refer
to land, submerged or filled, seaward of the "primitive" low-
water mark along the coast of Massachusetts. Lincoln Wharf is
located on such property. In the past, such properties
have been granted irrevocable licenses by the State for
private uses. Two years ago, the Massachusetts Legislature
established an administrative licensing process to replace
the legislative that, according to an editorial in the Boston
Globe on July 28, 1985, relied more on "political muscle than
technical evaluation." This legislation was heralded as a
great opportunity for the City to insure in the future that
the use of public properties would, indeed, be used in the
public interest.
As the States Coastal Zone Management Agency began to
draft the regulations, it became clear that the new process
would only grant revocable licenses. The reasoning for this
limitation was to insure that, in fact, properties given to
private uses would retain significant portions devoted to
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public use. However, as some conveyancers quickly pointed
out, the granting of revocable licenses would substantially
cloud title to these properties. Without clear title,
financing for the Lincoln Wharf development, and any other
such project, would be impossible.
This issue is currently in the thick of debate. There are
conveyancers and state officials arguing that title can be
clear with a revocable licensed condition for private use.
Nevertheless, certain amendments intended to resolve this
issue are now being drafted. An alternative solution is the
provision of a long-term lease with the City. The use of
irrevocable licenses is also not out of the question as the
Kenney Development Company currently has a bill filed, by
Representative DiMasi (D-Bos) of the North End District,
requesting legislative action. At this point, with a number
of viable solutions, the Kenney Development Company is fully
confident of a positive resolution.
Public. Benefits
The environment in which the Lincoln Wharf negotiations
have been conducted has been directly affected by the
transition in the mayor's office and a groundswell of public
interest in community-related matters. The developer's
original proposal was the only one of the three received that
contained public benefits as an integral component of the
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proposal. These benefits included the construction of new
facilities for the Boston fireboats on the North Ferry Pier,
a public promenade and a $375,000 contribution to the City's
housing program. Nevertheless, given the new Mayor's agenda
to open the downtown waterfront to the public through the use
of parks and a continuous promenade as well as an avowed
reorientation in the city's relationship to private
development, the project was "de-designated" in August of
1984. While there were very substantial legal questions
regarding the legitimacy of this action, the Kenney
Development Company renegotiated a relationship with the
city and was redesignated as the developer in August of 1985,
one year later.
This most recent designation provides for a maximum of
sixty-two condominiums of unspecified size to be built on
the 2.36 acre site. A maximum of 44 units may be built on
Lincoln Wharf with a total height of no more than seven
stories. Furthermore, it has been strongly suggested that the
addition of the sixth and seventh floors be stepped back,
away from the harbor. A maximum of eighteen newly constructed
condominiums may be built on the North Ferry Pier. At the
end of the pier, will be five public marina slips and docking
and office facilities for the Boston's two fireboats,
provided at the developer's expense. A minimum of one
19
parking space per residential unit is required. Full public
access around the perimeter of each pier has been agreed
upon. A public promenade is also mandated beside the North
Ferry Pier. A landing area for the city's new water taxis has
also been agreed to. These taxis, part of the Harborpark
Plan, will provide direct access to Logan Airport. In
addition to these requirements, a lump sum linkage payment of
$475,000 is required at seven years time from the date of
designation.
In terms of land use, more than 29% of the land area of
the development is devoted to public use, 14% is devoted to
parking and only 18% is occupied by buildings. 82% of the
development land and water area is open. For a graphic
description of the various land uses and their relationship
to each other, see Exhibit 3.
While many of the actual site and building relationships
have been sketched out by the project architect for the
purposes of negotiation and assessing potential issues, the
developer only now, with the obstacles removed, has begun to
determine how this development should be designed within the
constraints given and with the objective of building the
downtown waterfront's finest luxury residential development.
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CHAPTER 2
MARKET CONTEXT
For the purposes of assessing market conditions and a
pricing strategy for Lincoln Wharf, three perspectives are
assumed. The first is an examination of existing supply
conditions within the specific market area: what has been
developed, how have these projects appreciated in value, and
what conclusions can be drawn about pricing strategies? The
second perspective analyzes market demand: what has been the
market demand in the past and what is the anticipated market
demand for Lincoln Wharf? The third perspective considers
substantial waterfront projects coming on line in the next
three years which may impact the Lincoln Wharf development:
how are they similar, how are they different and do they
constitute a competitive threat? Based on this analysis,
Chapter 2 concludes with a pricing strategy for Lincoln Wharf
and a projected absorption rate.
The Market Area
Lincoln Wharf, and its specific market area, is located
within the larger fabric of Boston's North End. As an
integral part of this neighborhood, the following definition
and analysis of the specific market area, is set within the
context of Central Boston and the North End-Waterfront
Neighborhood. This area is surrounded on two sides by the
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harbor and on the inland side by North Station, the
Government Center, the financial district and Quincy Market.
Centrally located, access from Lincoln Wharf to Logan Airport
is ten minutes away by car, subway or ferry. Freeway access,
north and south, is no more than five minutes by car and the
subway is a ten minute walk.
Since the turn of the century, this neighborhood has been
a closely knit community of Italian descent. Characterized by
small winding streets and simple brick row buildings that
once housed those who worked on the waterfront and in the
markets, many residents still only speak Italian. Italian
bakeries, groceries and restaurants are found throughout
residential neighborhoods and the streets are often alive
with activity as there are few yards, parks or open spaces.
Over the past ten years this neighborhood has experienced
enormous growth and change. This growth has largely resulted
from the neighborhood's proximity to the economically
resurgent downtown Boston. The Central Boston area (the
Downtown, Back Bay, Beacon Hill, North End, Waterfront and
South Cove areas), has experienced record levels of
investment. From 1978 to 1983 and 1983 to 1988, over 7.1
billion dollars of private development investment has been
made or is scheduled. This same area is responsible for
48,000 of the 58,000 net increase in jobs in Boston over
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the 1976 to 1983 period. The Boston Redevelopment Authority
estimates that more dollars have been spent on a per-capita
basis for urban development in Boston than any other city in
the country. Since 1975, over twenty million square feet of
space has been added to the city's building supply.
This dramatic growth has had a direct impact on the North
End-Waterfront Neighborhood. From 1970 to 1980, the
population in this neighborhood increased by 5% while the
city's overall population decreased by 12%. Based on
projections made in 1982, this neighborhood's population is
expected to grow 38% from 1980 to 1990 and the need for
housing is expected to grow 46%. This population growth
reflects an enormous influx of new residents from outside the
community; the profile of this new resident is very different
than those currently living there. While Boston's total
number of households remained constant from 1970 to 1980,
this neighborhood increased by 38.7%, at the same time the
total number of families making up those households dropped
38%. Similarly, the average number of people living within
each household dropped by 23% to 1.8. This trend, according
to the Boston Redevelopment Authority report on this
neighborhood, which has provided the information for this
section, Boston andA the North Enn, June 1984, is partially
due to an increase in the number of elderly living alone, but
is predominately the result of the influx of young
24
professionals working in the downtown area.
Brokers state that it is this market and the "empty
nester" and divorced persons which has created the great
demand for condominiums in this area. From 1969 to 1983,
1,022 condominium units were established in the whole North
End-Waterfront Neighborhood through conversion of rental
property, rehabilitation of existing buildings and some new
construction. This area possesses 17% of Boston's
condominiums, based on the 1980 housing stock. But more
importantly, an overwhelming 48% of these North End-
Waterfront condominiums are in the Lincoln Wharf market area,
an area which represents a relatively small portion of the
total neighborhood. The size of the private development
investment in this specific area has been twice that of the
entire neighborhood. The total number of units developed per
building is 29 per building in the Lincoln Wharf market area
and an average of 15 per building for the entire
neighborhood.
h~e Specific Market Area
Lincoln Wharf and North Ferry, the second phase of the
development, currently represent the northern quadrant of
the North End waterfront market area, see Exhibit 4. This
market area is defined by the harbor on the eastern edge and
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by the Prince Building and the Mariner (formerly known as the
Gerard Freezer building), on the western side of Alantic
Avenue and Commercial Street and by Commercial Wharf and
Christopher Columbus Park on the south.
The Lincoln Wharf market area, while physically continuous
with adjacent neighborhoods, is clearly distinguished by both
its waterfront character and the substantial private
investment that has been made over the past twenty-five
years, but most particularly in the past ten years. Beginning
in the mid-1950s with Commercial Wharf, large warehouse
structures, both on piers and land, have been rehabilitated.
As with Commercial Wharf and the Prince Building, these
buildings were initially rental properties, but beginning in
the 1960s some condominiums were established. It was not,
however, until the early to mid-1970s with the renovation and
conversion of the Prince Building into condominiums, that the
first signs of a luxury residential neighborhood were seen.
While still very much a frontier community, the opening of
Lewis Wharf in 1977 heralded the formation of a neighborhood
which is now among the most highly valued in the city. In
1978, Union Wharf confirmed this ambition and with the
opening of the Mariner in June of this year, this
neighborhood, if the developer's objectives are met, may
contain the city's most expensive condominiums.
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Within the Lincoln Wharf market area there are five
substantial luxury residential developments: Union Wharf,
Lewis Wharf, the Mariner and two conversion properties, the
Prince Building and Commercial Wharf. They are sharply
defined visual contrasts between those projects on the
harbor side of Alantic Avenue and Commercial Street and those
on the city side. Averaging approximately 85 units, the
projects on the harbor side - Union Wharf, Lewis Wharf and
Commercial Wharf - are rehabilitated granite six-story
warehouses built on piers which jut out into the harbor with
marinas adjacent to them. These horizontal structures stand
in contrast against their two taller and higher-density
neighbors across the street. They are both rehabilitated ten-
story warehouses.
Existing Market Comparables
Of these projects, Union Wharf and Lewis Wharf are the
most similar to Lincoln Wharf and provide the most direct
comparative value. The Mariner, while distinctly different in
character, has just placed 83 units on the market and
therefore, provides the best indication of current sales
prices. The Prince Building has an extremely low turnover
rate, one unit per year, and therefore, while indicating the
high value placed on the building by its owners and thus a
28
very positive reflection on the market area, does not provide
comparative data. Commercial Wharf was a rental building
developed in the 1950s and has been condominiumized on a
unit-by-unit basis since the mid-1960s. As a conversion
building with both rentals and condominiums, this building,
unlike the Prince Building which received extensive
improvements by its developer, has not established itself as
a prestigious address nor commanded the values of its
neighbors so it is not considered in this analysis. No one
development is truly comparable; with this limitation, the
intent is to arrive at a cumulative perception of the market
conditions.
The sources of information which constitute the basis for
the following analysis include interviews with three
waterfront brokers and ten residents of Union Wharf and Lewis
Wharf, and the sale histories of the discussed buildings over
the past three years. An accounting of those interviewed may
be found in Table 2. Unless noted otherwise, all per-square-
foot values and sizes refer to the units themselves and
include the deck or balcony space, as is the common practice.
Lewis Wharf
Developed by Carl Koch, a well-known Boston architect,
Lewis Wharf was originally a six-story slate and granite
warehouse built on stone piers and fill. It serviced
29
schooners and other freight-carrying vessels during Boston's
halcyon days as a seaport. Rehabilitated in 1974 and 1975,
this eighty-four unit development went on the market in 1976
and was sold out in a year and a half.
The building is approximately 60% two-bedroom units,
averaging 1,300 square feet, and 40% one-bedroom units, one
half of which average 850 square feet, the other half
averaging 1,120 square feet. Services include 24-hour
security and a full-time building manager. Amenities include
a marina, a bocce ball court and a small swimming pool built
after the completion of the development. Parking is not
provided. Almost all units have unimpeded views either to
the north, overlooking Sargent's Wharf, or to the south,
overlooking the marina and Commercial Wharf. The first floor
is occupied by a range of retail stores, which include a
Store 24 and Roche-Bobois, a high-end furniture store. Also
on the first floor and on parts of the second and third
floors are office condominiums, owned by law firms and
financial consultants. These offices each have a separate
lobby and elevator.
Lewis Wharf has experienced the highest sales values on a
per-square-foot basis on the waterfront over the past three
years. In 1983, seven units, averaging 1,000 square feet in
size, were sold at $219 per square foot (psf). In 1984, only
30
two units were sold at a per-square-foot average of $187.
Currently, five units are under purchase and sale agreements.
The average per-square-foot value of these transactions is
$302. The per-square-foot rate of appreciation for the one
year, from the 1983/early 1984 period to 1985, was 445.
In the period from 1983 to 1985, 71% of the sales were for
two-bedroom units. While there were no sales of one-bedroom
units in 1985, there were two sales in 1984 and two in 1983.
Between those two periods there was no appreciation in value
for that type of unit. For the two-bedroom units, however,
the rate of appreciation in per-square-foot values, from
1983/1984 to 1985 has been 30%. It can be concluded from this
rate of appreciation, when compared to the rate of
appreciation for one-bedroom units, that there is a strong
market preference for two-bedroom units in this development.
The turnover rate of these units is relatively high, see
Exhibit 5, but local brokers claim this is coincidental. A
summary of the sales history of Lewis Wharf over the past
three years may be found in Table 3.
Union Wharf
Very similar in size and physical character to Lewis
Wharf, the first phase of Union Wharf, for our purposes,
represents a unique view on the market demand: it was
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Exhibit 5
The Turnover Rates For Selected Developments In The
Lincoln Wharf Market Area
---- ----------------------------------------------------
Lewis Union Prince
Wharf Wharf Building
-------------------------------------------
1983 8.3% 3.45 2.2%
1984 2.4% 4.6% 2.2%
1985 6% 3.45 2.2%
-------------------------------------------
Average: 5.6% 3.8% 2.2%
------------------------ 
------------------
Note:
-The above turnover rates for Union and Lewis Wharves are
based the sales histories of these projects as documented
in Table 3, for Lewis Wharf, and Table 4, for Union Wharf.
-The 2.2% turnover rate for the Prince Building is based on
one sale per year over the past three years. This
information was provided brokers.
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developed as raw space and the unit purchasers completed
their own units. The developers, Jim Craig and Austin Heath
with two limited partners, provided finished lobbies and
corridors and rough plumbing and electrical services. The
units themselves were offered as shells, with only bare
brick walls and a concrete floor slab. Rough unit sizes
ranged from 1,175 square feet to 1,800 square feet.
Because the market area was still considered frontier and
this development concept virtually untried in Boston, except
for the Ritz-Carlton, banks required that the development be
sold as quickly as possible in order to test the market.
Presales began in the fall of 1977 and completion and
exchange of titles occurred in May of 1978 with final sellout
in the summer of 1979. The presale market, according to
brokers, was initally slow but momentum quickly gained. The
average sales price was $75 psf, which was considered high
at the time, and construction costs by the owners averaged
between $25 to $30 psf to finish off their respective units.
The issues raised by the development approach of providing
rough space are discussed later, but what is of interest is
that 90% of the units were built out by owners as two-bedroom
units. While this is in part due to the large sizes of the
units sold, it strongly suggests that is the higher-end,
"empty nester" and divorced person market, that prefers this
approach.
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The second phase of the Union Wharf development, completed
in 1980, contained twenty-seven row house triplexes at the
harbor end of the pier. These units average 2,300 square feet
and have unimpeded views to either the inner or outer
harbor, while the end units have views in three directions.
Sold on a preconstruction basis, these units were
approximately 90% sold out by completion in 1980. Their
unique position in the market -- the only ground-level luxury
townhouses on Boston's waterfront -- was the reason for the
success of these units.
Like Lewis Wharf, Union Wharf has a small swimming pool, a
marina, 24-hour security and a full-time building manager.
Unlike Lewis Wharf, however, there is no retail use and
parking is leased to owners. Union Wharf also has office use
within its development. Aside from the first floor which is
completely devoted to this use, the offices can be found
scattered among the second- and third-floor residential
condominiums and, most particularly, in the triplexes. These
offices are largely occupied by lawyers and financial
consultants. One broker estimates that the business ownership
represents as much as 10% to 15% of the building.
Over the past three years, Union Wharf has experienced the
highest resale prices on the waterfront. In the 1983/early
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1984 period, prices ranged from $304,000 to $480,000 for an
average of $240 psf. From mid-1984 to January 1985, five
sales occurred with prices ranging from $262,500 to $825,000.
The average per-square-foot sales price was $266, a 30%
increase in one year.
Two units are of particular interest as they have been
resold twice in the past two years. Unit 607 is a 1,530
square foot duplex on the North side of Union Wharf. Although
its views of the water are blocked by the Alantic Avenue
Power Station, this unit sold for $340,000 ($222 psf) in
May of 1983. Nineteen months later this same unit sold for
$455,000 ($297 psf), representing an annual rate of
appreciation of 20%. Unit 18 is a triplex containing 2,286
square feet and faces south with water views. This unit was
sold in March of 1984 for $480,000 ($210 psf). Seven months
later it was sold for for $575,000 ($252 psf), appreciating
at a rate of 34% annually.
The single most outstanding characteristic of the resales
from 1983 to 1985 is that 90% of the units resold have been
three-bedroom units with an average size of 2,065 square
feet. These units represent only 31% of the total unit mix.
Of the three-bedroom unit resales in this period, 54% of the
transactions, or 60% of the total transactions have been for
triplexes. When looking at the resales of the triplexes in
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the 1983/1984 period to the 1984/1985 period, the per-square-
foot values increase from $202 to $277, a 37% annual
increase.
This disproportionate relationship between the resales of
the triplexes and all other units in this period is explained
by the high percentage of units owned by businesses. One
broker who has handled many of these sales has stated that
there has been almost no sales of residential units and that
the triplex sales that have occurred have been businesses
which have grown in size and need larger facilities.
When looking at the other units sold, the nature of the
turnover market becomes even clearer. Unit 607 was sold in
1983 by a couple in their fifties who wanted to renovate a
small building just outside the market area and move into it.
This couple has moved four times in the past eight years.
Their residences in the past have included Lewis Wharf and
the Prince Building. Unit 607 was then bought by a younger
couple, who sold their condominium in 1985 because they had
adopted a child and needed a house with a yard. The sale of
this unit twice in the same year accounts for 20% of the
sales transactions in this period. The business condominiums
account for another 50% with the remaining 30% unaccounted
for. From this, it may be surmised that the already low
average turnover rate of 3.8% for this three-year period, can
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be largely accounted for by an increased need for space in
both residential and business use, and not due to any lack of
desire for the development itself. A summary of the sales
history of Union Wharf over the past three years may be found
in Table 4.
Ie Mariner
Formerly a cold storage warehouse, this relatively tall
existing eight-story brick and concrete building has been
rehabilitated over the past one and a half years. As part of
this construction, two stepped-back floors have been added to
the top of the building. Developed by the East Mar
Corporation, the Mariner opened the doors to its model units
on June 23rd of this year and began presales for a January
1986 completion date. The sales prices are among the most
ambitious in all of Boston. The per-square- foot sales prices
range from a low of $224 for a second-floor studio facing
west to North Street with views only of the street to $500
psf for a 1,900 square foot penthouse with spectacular views
of Boston Harbor. The $500 per-square-foot selling price for
tenth-floor units and the $450 for the ninth-floor units
exceeds that of any luxury condominium project in Boston. The
Four Season's highest per-square-foot value is $425 and in
Charles Place in Cambridge it is $400. Harbor Towers, which
is a conversion building with spectacular views in a less
desirable neighborhood, is currently selling for $150 to $200
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psf. The Mariner's average selling price is $388,205 per
unit ($365 psf). This $365 is 20% higher than the average
current sales price at Lewis Wharf and 37% higher than Union
Wharf, both firmly established prestigious addresses on the
preferred waterside of the market area. A summary of the
sales prices, unit sizes and unit distribution may be found
in Table 5.
Understanding the pricing of the units is further
complicated by the project's notable drawbacks. The most
expensive units with water views on the lower floors face
directly onto Commercial Street which is noisy and dirty.
Residents at Union and Lewis Wharves who live more than 100
feet away from Commercial Street cite the noise and dirt
created by the street as the single greatest drawback of
those developments. The awkward handling of the foyers and
the galley-type kitchens combined with a second-rate level of
finish -- sprayed on stucco ceilings, exposed sprinkler heads
and the like -- does not create the impression that this
building is even close to being amongst Boston's finest
residential developments, as the pricing would have you
believe. Furthermore, no feature services are provided other
than valet attendants for indoor parking, and there is no
marina.
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Nevertheless, the brokers claim twenty-three deposits
within the three-week period the development has been for
sale. The great majority of these deposits have been for
studios and one-bedroom units. The highest per-square-foot
value obtained to date is somewhere between $400 to $450 psf,
according to the broker. This value is 12% to 26% higher than
the highest per-square-foot value paid to date in the
waterfront market area. While receiving deposits on 27% of
the units within a three-week period is a very strong market
response, it should be clearly noted that they are only
deposits. In a highly speculative market these deposits can
disappear if consumer confidence is not maintained.
Aside from the ambitious sales price objectives of the
Mariner, an analysis of the pricing within the development
provides several key observations which will contribute to
the pricing strategy for Lincoln Wharf. Two types of
analysis were conducted. The first looked at the relationship
between unit size and the per-square-foot sales price and
which the second considered the pricing impact of the
available views on different units.
When analysing unit size and per-square-foot selling
price, a very clear and notable set of relationships becomes
apparent. As you will note in Exhibit 6, there is a direct
proportional relationship between the floor the unit is
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Exhibit 6
The Mariner:
An Analysis Of The Relationships Between Unit Size, The
P.S.F. Sales Price, The Floor Location and Unit Distribution
Analysis of Unit Size, Sales P.S.F. and Floor Hieght Based
On Average Sales Prices For The Unit Sizes Indicated.
--- ----------------------------------------------- ------
Floor 600 to 900 to 1,300 to 1,600 S.F.
Number 900 S.F. 1,300 S.F. 1,600 S.F. And Above
--- -----------------------------------------------------
Two $258 $309
Three $259 $323
Four $256 $360
Five $321 $360 $356
Six $352 $371 $372
Seven $378 $382 $386 $388
Eight $400 $400 $400 $400
Nine $450 $450 $450
Ten $500 $500
Analysis of Unit Size, Unit Distribution and Floor Hieght:
The following Analysis calculates the number of units within
the indicated range size.
---- -----------------------------------------------------
Two 9 3
Three 9 3
Four 9 3
Five 6 3 1
Six 5 2 2
Seven 3 3 2 2
Eight 4 2 2 1
Nine 2 4
Ten 1 3
located on, its size and its per-square-foot sales price.
Units on the second floor ranging in size from 600 to 900
square feet are 20% cheaper on per-square-foot basis than
units ranging in sizes 900 to 1300 square feet on the same
floor. This relationship repeats itself consistently
throughout the building. Unit size and the per-square-foot
sales price are directly related. The developer's logic
behind this pricing is that larger units are more valuable
than smaller units in per-square-foot sales prices. A
similar study of Union and Lewis Wharves does not indicate
this unusual relationship.
Similarly, the relationship between the views offered and
the sales price is, as one might expect, direct. Of greater
interest is the strong relationship between the size of the
unit and its view and its sales price: the better the view,
the larger the unit and the higher the per-square-foot sales
price. As you will note, this relationship is more pronounced
with those units with little or no views of the city and
those with an oblique view of the water as the other three
types have optimal views and are approximately in the same
price range. The logic of this pricing strategy assumes that
with an increase in locational value there is an increase in
the desire for space. This reasoning and the logic applied to
pricing units in terms of size, is ill-conceived. It does
not consider the top-of-the-market purchasers who desire a
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small penthouse, for example. The results of this analysis
may be found in Exhibit 7.
Qualifications do need to be made when considering the
view analysis of the Mariner. The writer of this thesis has
not seen each of these units and the analysis is based on a
limited number of floor plans, visual inspection of the
exterior and an inspection of four units. For these reasons,
the results of the analysis are approximate and their value
is in the approximate patterns they indicate.
These results are not consistent with the sales of Union
Wharf and Lewis Wharf. There is not a significant price
differentiation between units with views to the north and
south or even units with limited views. Floor level does not
appear in the analysis as significant. These findings are
inconsistent with commonly held perceptions regarding
locational value and are probably the result of the limited
sales data and the lack of information regarding exact
locations of individual units.
Market Demand
Three perspectives are assumed in analysing the anticipated
demand for Lincoln Wharf. The first considers the historical
demand in this market area; the second, current demand at two
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Exhibit 7
The Mariner:
Analysis Of The Impact Of Views On Unit Size
And Price Per Square Foot
FlR No City No City Good City Good Good
# or water View, View, Views Views
View Oblique Oblique City Of
Water Water Only Water
S.F. P.S.F S.F. P.S.F S.F. P.S.F S.F. P.S.F S.F.P.S.F
2. 607 $225 958 $300 1,254 $325
3. 607 $237 958 $313 1,254 $341
4. 607 $250 889 $350 1,176 $384
5. 585 $282 1,210 $350 840 $344 1,254 $364
6. 1,210 $365 840 $367 1,254 $376
7. 1,198 $380 899 $378 1,378 $385
8. 1,210 $400 899 $400 1,254 $400
9. 1,094 $450 1094 $450 1,656 $450
10. 1,669 $500 1,859 $500
Averages:
600 $249 935 $321 1,265 $408 914 $388 1,371 $392
Note:
-The above analysis is based on sales prices given to
brokers. The determination of views and view quality is based
on visual inspection of the exterior of the building, a
limited set of floor plans and a walk through of four units
available for viewing. The data, therefore, is limited to the
extent that it shows approximate pricing patterns only.
-Headings describing no views of city, refer to units that
look across the street to other buildings. Units with views
to city, have expansive views. Oblique views of water refers
to units in which one has look out and down the side of the
building inorder to see water.
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comparable developments outside of the market area; and the
third, current demand as assessed by brokers and by the
pricing turnover studies reviewed earlier. Profiles of
prospective buyers are then described.
Historical Demand
Much of what is known about market demand for Lewis Wharf
and Union Wharf is based on information provided by
waterfront brokers. Of the three brokers interviewed for
this thesis, two were directly involved with the sales at
Union Wharf but none were involved with Lewis Wharf. For this
reason, this section on historical demand is limited to Union
Wharf.
According to the brokers, the sales for the first phase
of Union Wharf, the rehabilitated warehouse, were
predominately sold to "empty nesters" and divorced persons.
Many came from Lewis Wharf and the Prince Building and a
smaller amount came from the suburbs of Boston. The large
draw from the market area is accounted for by the fact that
many residents saw the opportunity to build out their own
units as very attractive. Brokers estimate that of those
purchasing units in this building, 15% to 20% were bought for
investment purposes, 5% to 10% were businesses and the
remaining 70% to 80% were those simply buying residences. It
is further estimated that 30% of all transactions were
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speculative and resulted in the selling of deposits and down
payments.
The speculative market for phase two of the Union Wharf
townhouses was even stronger, brokers and owners claimed
that 50% of the units sold were paper transactions.
Approximately one half of these units were bought for
business purposes. approximately another 10% were bought for
investment purposes, with the remaining percentile buying for
residential use. For the entire development, only 5% of the
sales were to families. The lack of yards, other children and
the problem of getting children to schools has eliminated
this market.
Comparable Developments Outside ihe Market Area
Four developments were considered for this analysis:
Church Court, Charles Place, the Four Seasons and the Ritz-
Carlton. The brokers for the Ritz-Carlton never responded to
this writer's inquiries. The broker for the Four Seasons was
extremely reluctant to provide any information regarding
those who had purchased condominiums. The following
information on Church Court and Charles Place was provided by
Erin Teach, the broker for Church Court, and Carmine Cerone,
the broker for Charles Place.
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Developed and designed by Graham Gund, Church Court was
completed in the early spring of 1984. According to Erin
Teach, the market for Church Court was drawn by the
building's "flashy" image and its location on Memorial Drive
with views of the Charles River. While located in the Back
Bay, the buyers were decidedly not from this area as those
living in this neighborhood did not like the building's
image. Twenty percent of the buyers were young professionals,
ages 32 to 52, all buying one-bedroom units averaging 870
square feet in size; forty percent went to "empty nesters"
and divorced persons who bought two-bedroom units averaging
1,270 square feet; and twenty percent went to divorced women
who bought the three-bedroom units averaging 1,450 square
feet. The remaining percentage is unknown. The unit mix is
20% one-bedroom units, 60% two-bedroom units and 20% three-
bedroom units. Prices ranged from $160 to $350 psf and the
building sold out in eighteen months.
Carmine Cerone, of Charles Place, estimates that of the
seventy-seven units sold to date out of the total of eighty-
six, 25% were sold to single young professionals in their
late-thirties to mid-forties, 5% were families, 5% were
investors looking for long-term appreciation and 50% were
"empty nesters" and divorced persons ranging in age from the
early-forties to mid-sixties. Forty percent of the buyers
had some affilation with Harvard University. The unit mix is
15% one-bedroom units, 55% two-bedroom units and 30% three-
bedroom units. Carmine Cerone noted that the buyers in this
building were not interested in the Boston market, only in
the Cambridge market. Prices have ranged from $250 to $400
psf and the development began presales in January of 1983 and
is 90% sold after two and a half years, six months more than
the developers, Carpenter and Company, had planned.
These two developments are similar in their market
positioning in several key respects. Both are of new
construction and have similar unit mixes. And despite the
notable differences in locational preferences, as a group,
the buyers have similar demographic profiles. This unit mix
and demand profile is the same as what the waterfront brokers
project as the most appropriate for the Lincoln Wharf
development.
Proj.ecting A Profile fLr Buyers
As the sales value analysis for Union and Lewis Wharves
indicated, the strongest market demand appears to be for two-
bedroom units and three-bedroom units; they have shown the
greatest appreciation. Brokers, nonetheless, state that there
is a strong market for one-bedroom units. This market,
however, is much more restricted in its ability to pay. As
they point out and as may be seen in the structuring of the
Mariner, one-bedroom units provide a valuable solution to
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less desirable locations in the building as they allow the
young professional buyers a point of entry.
The young professional is typically a first-time buyer
ranging in age from the mid-thirties to mid-forties. This
purchase is seen as an investment towards a larger unit at
some later time. They desire a prestigious address close to
the business and social centers in downtown Boston. These
purchasers have limited assets and as such, they are
restricted in the total dollar amount they are capable of
paying. For this reason and because they do not require large
living quarters, this market typically seeks one-bedroom
units ranging in size from 750 square feet to 900 square feet
(not including the balcony).
The "empty nester" and divorced persons market is typified
by a couple or a person ranging in age from the early forties
to the mid-sixties. They work full time in Boston, commuting
daily by car or train. Most own second or third homes. Almost
all are from New England and most have summered along the
coast of New England. A significant number have boats. The
primary motivation for living on the waterfront is a love of
the ocean and the historic character of Boston and Boston's
North End combined with the waterfront's direct proximity to
the downtown Boston business district. With the children
gone, this purchase represents an opportunity to realize the
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desire to live by the sea while continuing to work in Boston.
Accustomed to comfortable living standards and wanting
overnight guests, these buyers desire two-bedroom units
ranging in size from 1,200 square feet to 1,600 square feet,
with the larger units having a study/den. This same market
has also shown a limited, but nonetheless accountable
interest in even larger units of up to 2,000 square feet.
This last market is often called the "penthouse market" as
they are looking for the very finest in residential
accommodations.
Waterfront Projects Coming on Line Over the Next Three Years
Two residential waterfront projects are slated for
completion within the next three years; San Marco, localted
between Lincoln Wharf and Commercial Street, and Rowes Wharf
which is just south of Harbor Towers outside the North End
waterfront market area.
San Marco
The San Marco's development, to be constructed in the
rehabilitated Alantic Avenue Power Station on Commercial
Street, will supply 192 condominium units. The developer is a
non-profit community-based organization associated with the
Archdiocese of Boston who have publicly committed themselves
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to selling the units at cost to North End residents.
Construction started in July of 1984 and is expected to be
completed by July of 1986. Because the project is being sold
at cost, it is not really a market-rate alternative for
potential buyers of Lincoln Wharf. The physical proximity of
this development, however, is of interest as its property
directly abuts the Lincoln Wharf site. More than one broker
has identified this issue as potentially compromising the
high-end luxury image of Lincoln Wharf. While there are
limitations to what can be done, a number of architectural
design solutions have been proposed to mitigate this issue,
one of which considers the location of the lobby in the
following chapter.
Rowes Wharf
Rowes Wharf represents a waterfront version of Boston's
new combined luxury hotel and condominium developments. Like
the Ritz-Carlton, Charles Place and the Four Seasons, this
project, developed by the Beacon Companies, will provide 100
luxury condominium units with all of the services and
amenities found in a 218-room, luxury hotel. These services
include everything from maid and secretarial services to
catered meals. As part of a large complex, residents can walk
from their condominiums to first-class resturants or a health
club without ever leaving the building. Construction started
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in the spring of 1985, and occupancy is expected in summer
1987, the same period in which Lincoln Wharf anticipates its
intial occupancy. In terms of unit size and unit mix, 20% of
the units will be one-bedroom units, approximately 800 to
900 square feet, not including the balcony. The remaining
unit distributions are as yet undetermined, but it is
surmised by brokers that they will roughly approximate those
of Church Court and Charles Place; that is, 40% to 60% two-
bedroom units and 20% to 30% three-bedroom or deluxe two-
bedroom units.
A number of important characteristics should be considered
in assessing how competitive this project will be with
Lincoln Wharf. While Rowes Wharf will have better views
directly out to the harbor, and is closer to the financial
district, its location in respect to the central business
district has a number of potential drawbacks. Beyond the
ominous presence of the Southeast Expressway two-hundred feet
away, which breaks the continuity between the city and the
waterfront in this particular area, this development could
also become associated with Quincy Market. The association
of a national tourist attraction with a luxury development is
potentially a very negative one. The image of thousands of
tourists that flood this part of Boston every summer, is not
conducive to the image of high-class residential complex.
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While by its very size, it will establish its own
"neighborhood", the development is not associated with any
existing noted residential neighborhood. Charles Place is on
the south end of the Brattle Street neighborhood and the Four
Seasons is associated with the Back Bay and will soon have
the Arlington-Hadassah development -- a complex of luxury
residential townhouses facing Boston Garden -- immediately
adjacent. From a practical point of view and aside from the
specialty shops at the Faneuil Hall Markets, everyday
shopping is a problem.
Given the project size of 650,000 square feet, the most
important distinctions between Lincoln Wharf and Rowes Wharf
will be one of scale and location. Lincoln Wharf will depend
on its small size and its location within an established
neighborhood with great character. The image of Lincoln Wharf
as a small exclusive enclave within a historical setting
directly contrasts against the new polished urbane image of
this enormous complex. For these reasons, it is felt by the
project manager at Beacon Companies, Carol Gladstone, and by
this writer, that while there will be some .ross-over market,
the two projects will appeal to different taste segments of
the upper-scale market.
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The Pricing Strategy For Lincoln Wharf
Four factors are considered in the formulation of sales
prices for Lincoln Wharf. The first is the average sales
price on a per-square-foot basis for the entire development
and it serves as a reference point when assessing individual
unit sales prices. The second is the range of sales prices: a
per-square-foot sales price ceiling and minimum, given the
physical characteristics of Lincoln Wharf. The third
consideration is the total dollar price which acts as a
constraint on both size and per-square-foot values. Finally,
within these ranges, the fourth factor establishes a
mechanism for differentiating per-square-foot sales prices by
floor and view location within the building. As pricing is
also a function of the design program, final consideration of
sales prices is made in the following chapter. The organizing
principles, however, are as follows.
From the preceding analysis we have established a current
per-square-foot average value of $296 for Union and Lewis
Wharves. Assuming that the broker's evaluation of the Mariner
is correct, that units are overpriced by 20%, a recalculated
per-square-foot sales price for this project would be $288.
This figure is 3% less than the $296 average resale figure
for Union and Lewis Wharves.
As has been discussed, the developer intends to produce a
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product that is similar to Union Wharf and Lewis Wharf, but
incorporates a higher degree of finish and sophistication.
This consideration, combined with the fact that Lincoln
Wharf will be the first construction on the water-side of the
waterfront market area in seven years, suggests that we can
add a premium -- a 10% value margin, specifically -- when
establishing the overall pricing of Lincoln Wharf. In other
words, if Lincoln Wharf were on the market today, I would
price it 10% above that of Union Wharf and Lewis Wharf. The
overall average for Lincoln Wharf is $296 (the 1985 per-
square-foot average of Union Wharf and Lewis Wharf), plus $30
psf (10% of $296) leads us to an anticipated overall average
sales price of $326 psf, a price 10% less than the average
sales price of the Mariner.
The per-square-foot sales price ceiling is a function of
the overall luxury market in Boston, of the luxury market
in the Lincoln Wharf market area and ultimately of what the
product is. Brokers have varied in their assessment of what
this value might be for Lincoln Wharf ranging from $360 to
$400 psf, if on the market today. Two units, one at Lewis
Wharf and one at Union Wharf, have recently achieved values
of $357 psf. Rowes Wharf, according to Carol Gladstone, the
project manager at Beacon Companies, is assuming $450 psf in
today's dollars. As I have mentioned, Four Seasons is
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currently getting $425 and Charles Place has gotten $400 psf.
These last three projects are mixed-use developments with
hotels and provide a level of service and amenities which
Lincoln Wharf cannot. The distinction between these
developments and Lincoln Wharf is discussed later.
If one accepts the presumed 10% value margin on the top
current waterfront values of $357 psf, regardless of the $400
to $450 per-square-foot sales claimed by the brokers at the
Mariner, one arrives at the top selling price of $390 psf.
This figure is 22% below the tenth-floor values at the
Mariner and 13% below that of the ninth floor and is
approximately between the average square foot sales values of
the seventh and eighth floors. More importantly, however, it
is 13% below that of Rowes Wharf whose development comes on
line at the same time as Lincoln Wharf.
The third factor considers the absolute value as a
controlling factor, both in terms of what the maximum amount
the market is willing to pay and what it is able to pay. It
is assumed that for the high-end units the issue is not the
ability to pay but the willingness to pay. The top achievable
value is a function of both values of comparable penthouses
and the market supply at that time. In the Lincoln Wharf
market area, the highest value achieved to date is $825,000
for a townhouse at Union Wharf at the end in January of 1985
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and thus serves as a key reference point.
The issue of ability to pay comes more into play with the
smaller one-bedroom units directed towards the young
professional market. Brokers claim that 80% of these buyers
are single and live alone. Being younger with fewer assets
and lower earning power, these purchasers, while in the
highest income brackets, have limited buying capability
relative to other purchasers in this market. As discussed
earlier, one-bedroom units over the past three years at Union
Wharf and Lewis Wharf have not shown appreciation. While this
analysis may be based on very limited information, it
indicates a range of absolute values of between $142,000 and
$262,000. With 10% down, the mortgage cost at 12% on
$173,000, the average absolute value of the five units sold
over the past three years, is $1,586 per month. This requires
a gross income of $63,000 a year, assuming that 30% of the
gross income is covering mortgage costs. Given the same
financing terms but for $262,000, the required annual income
is $95,000. Brokers have stated that the ceiling for this
market is approximately in the range of $250,000.
The fourth factor considers the approach to setting values
according to relative location within the building complex.
The pricing structure at the Mariner, as discussed, provides
a valuable model but which has significant shortcomings. The
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Mariner's assumption is that an increase in locational value
results in not only an increase in per-square-foot sales
price but they have designed their project so that it
reflects an increase in size also. This assumption is based
on increased expectations. It is also assumed that with an
increase in locational value there is a proportional increase
in the demand for space. More than one broker has spoken of
the single person who desires a one-bedroom penthouse with an
excellent view. Size and per-square-foot values are not
necessarily positively correlated. For these reasons, the
pricing of units at Lincoln Wharf should not follow the
pricing structure of the Mariner. The absolute prices are a
function of the above discussion and the issues raised in the
following chapter on Development Design Scenarios.
Absorption
As indicated in Exhibit 8, the absorption rate for the
Lincoln Wharf market area and non-waterfront developments of
comparable value has been calculated. Within the Lincoln
Wharf market area the range of absorption rates is great.
Lewis Wharf is twice that of the second phase of Union
Wharf. This is due to the newness of the development type at
the time of marketing. The mean value as represented by the
first phase of Union Wharf is 1.9 units per month less than
Lewis Wharf which is 4.7. It is, however, much more in line
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Exhibit 8
Absorption Rates
For The Lincoln Wharf Market Area
And "Comparable" Condominium Projects
Waterfront Projects
------------ 
------------ -------------------
Development Presale Sales Total # Total # Absorp.
& Sale Period Period Of Months Of Units Rate
Start Date (Months) (Months)
--------------------------------------------
Lewis Wharf 9 9 18 84 4.7
1977
Union Wharf
Phase One 8 13 21 59 2.8
Fall, 1977
Phase Two 12 0 12 27 2.3
Winter, 1979
--------------------------------------------
Non-Waterfront Projects
------------------------------ 
------------
Church Court N/A N/A 18 43 2.4
N/A
Charles Place 29 3 32 86 2.7
Winter, 1983
Four Seasons N/A N/A 12 42 3.5
Spring, 1984
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with the non-waterfront absorption rates. Union Wharf also
provides the most recent data and phase one is the most
similar in size to Lincoln Wharf, 59 units as compared to
Lincoln Wharf's 44 units. What distinguishes Union Wharf from
all others, however, is that it was developed as rough space.
Given that Union Wharf's absorption rate is similar to those
outside of the market area and because those outside the
market area are recent and current, the absorption rate of
2.8 units per month is assumed for Lincoln Wharf.
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CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPMENT DESIGN SCENARIOS
The following chapter discusses the key considerations in
formulating the development strategy for Lincoln Wharf.
Working within the established framework set by both physical
and legal constraints as well as the anticipated character
of market demand, three strategic issues are addressed.
These issues are addressed in the following section by first
looking at the larger organizing principles of the building,
itself: what are the fundamental design assumptions which
determine the buildings layout. This is then followed by
more specific issues. The first issue examines the, design
program and sketches the outline for the overall development
product, given a set of design objectives and the existing
building structure. The second issue examines the specific
character of the individual condominium unit: whether it
should be supplied as finished or unfinished space, given
the implications of such a decision in terms of desirability,
management and costs. The third issue examines the provision
of concierge service, a practice that has become more common
in the larger luxury condominium developments in Boston.
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The Design Program
The maximum building envelope has been determined through
negotiations between the city and the developer. The
additional construction cost of adding two floors is far
outweighed by the potential sales values. The average
construction cost, including the cost of rebuilding the pier
and the construction of a new deck, is $124 psf of net
sellable building area. The projected average per-square-foot
sales value is $375 for the sixth floor and $390 on the
seventh floor. The construction cost of building the
additional two floors is $1,802,000. The sales return based
on net sellable square feet is $4,415,000, a return on
investment of 245%. The following analysis, therefore,
examines the organization within the seven story building
itself. In the following section, three fundamental design
objectives are reviewed. Based on these objectives and on the
market analysis, final unit sizes, distribution and mix are
determined.
Design Considerations
Three fundamental design considerations serve to organize
the building. The first objective is to have floor-through
units which would provide views north and south. The second
considers the optimal location of the lobby and elevator
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within the building. The third reviews the allowable unit
widths and sizes given the existing structural bays.
Circulation and Unit Layout: A Marketing Problem?
The use of floor-through units precludes the use of
central-loaded corridors. This provides several distinct
advantages. Central-loaded corridors at Union Wharf and Lewis
Wharf are described by residents as long, dark and hotel-
like. By dividing the building in half, these corridors also
create a pricing differential between north- and south-facing
units, even though this was not seen in the market analysis.
The decision to not use central-loaded corridors is further
supported by both the very shallow units they would create in
this relatively narrow forty-three foot wide building and by
the lost revenues due to unit area displaced by corridors.
The circulation problems created by this objective are as
numerous as the advantages. Primary vertical circulation will
be by an elevator which services the third and sixth floors,
plus individual unit service to those condominiums units
directly abutting the elevator from the second floor to the
sixth. Horizontal circulation occurs on the north side of the
building on the third and sixth floors. Vertical circulation
from the third and sixth floors to the second, fourth and
fifth will be from four vertical stair towers on the north
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side, entered from the third and sixth floors. These stair
towers will be private and shared by no more than two units.
The travel scenarios are as follows. To get to the third
or sixth floor one simply goes up the elevator to these
floors and goes to their residence. To get to a fifth floor
destination, one goes up the elevator to the sixth floor and
walks down the hallway to the stair tower that services their
condominium and then goes downstairs to their residence. The
same scenario applies to the second and fourth floors. One
has to go downstairs from the third floor to get to the
second floor and go upstairs from the third floor to get to
the fourth floor.
Two problems arise with this organization. The first is
the conceptual and practical problem of going up the elevator
and then having to go up or down stairs to reach the
desired destination. Conceptually, this going up and then
going down, seems confusing and cumbersome. Practically, the
problem of carrying groceries first up the elevator and then
up a flight of stairs sounds laborious. On the other hand,
the corridors and stairways will be on the north outermost
side of the building with excellent views to the marina and
inner harbor. The doorway, entry and the stairway itself will
be designed to serve as the formal entry to the residence.
While the stairway is shared with one neighbor, for all
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intents and purposes it is private and it is expected that
people will furnish them as such. This arrangement is
reminiscent of shared furnished foyers at elevator stops in
luxury developments in New York. As will be evident in the
discussion below, once the owner has gone up or down the
stairs to their unit, they will not be required to use any
other stairs to reach the kitchen.
The second problem is more difficult to solve. The
corridors on the third and sixth floors separate the units on
those floors from the views on the north side. The layouts of
the units themselves will be directly affected. Uses such a
kitchen, study/den and bathroom, which can have either no
windows or high windows, will necessarily occupy the north
side of the condominium. This is the logical location
anyways, as the living room and master bedroom would be
located on the south side with better light and views.
In the organization described above, corridors represent
2% of the total gross square footage and the vertical stairs
represent 3% of the total gross square footage. Adding
central-loaded or side-loaded corridors on the north side on
floors two, four and five would displace 2,970 of sellable
square feet. The average per-square-foot value of the three
affected floors is $305, which means that the use of this
organization would result in a net loss of $670,000 or 12% of
the profits based on the proforma for finshed units. This
$670,000 does account for the $236,250 saved by not building
the vertical stairs. In addition to this, the Boston
Redevelopment Authority has acknowledged the vertical stair
towers. If they were removed, it is highly unlikely that the
city would approve adding horizontal corridors to the entire
side of the building, this would be required if the
development were to maintain the same amount of sellable
square feet as the above scenario, since it would be seen as
a virtual horizontal expansion of the existing structure.
Therefore, not using this circulation system and going to a
more traditional one, a corridor on each floor, would result
in the signficant loss of sellable square footage.
This cost analysis combined with both the unquantified but
significant value of providing views north and south and the
highly attractive hallways, significantly outweighs the
marketing concerns raised. Careful architectural attention
paid to the entries of the stair towers will substantially
mitigate problems perceived by the market.
Location af Lobby A Elevator-
The series of events that lead up to the entry of
building -- the crossing of the site, either by foot or car
-- are important architectural and marketing considerations
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in the orchestration of a sense of dignity and anticipation.
The location of the entry, the lobby and the elevator plays a
critical role in this event. These building elements are
also vital to the building image. Residents of Lewis Wharf
have described long evenings in which the refurbishing of the
building's lobby have been discussed at great length. From
an efficiency standpoint, the location of the lobby and
elevator are key organizing elements as they not only
structure the building approach, but also the internal
organization of the building as well.
Two schemes are considered for the location of the entry
and elevator. The first places the lobby and elevator at the
western end of the building. This location capitalizes on the
required vehicular entry which passes under the building at
this point. This is required because the western edge of the
building is adjacent to the property line and no other
automobile entry is available. This automobile entry
provides a covered entryway for cars to stop and drop off
passengers, groceries or luggage. From a security point of
view, this single point of entry for both cars onto the wharf
and people into the building is optimal.
The second scheme places the lobby in the center of the
building, away from the San Marco development, facing south
with views of the outer harbor. This scheme serves to
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disassociate the visitor from the adjacent development and
Commercial Street and provides a greater sense of entry as
the visitor is required to pass under the building and then
out onto the pier with full view of the harbor and the
marina. It also minimizes interior travel distances. In the
first scheme the maximum corridor distance one would have to
walk is 160 feet on the third floor, while in the second
scheme this distance is reduced to 80 feet. A covered entry
for automobiles would be provided on the middle of the south
side.
The cost between the two schemes in terms of lost revenues
is marginal. The per-square-foot pricing differential between
the two locations is approximately 25%. The cost of 42
square feet (6'x7') times the six floors displaced by the
elevator at the west end is $60,000 and at the central
location $77,000, a difference of $17,000. A final
consideration is the private elevator stops servicing two
units on non-corridor floors two, four and five. This would
occur in either scheme, but in the first location the
elevator would be servicing low-end one-bedroom/studio
condominiums and in the central location they would be
servicing the more expensive two-bedroom condominiums. The
increase in value generated by a private elevator stop will
be much greater in the central location and will more than
account for the pricing differential. For this reason, in
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addition to the others above, the central location is assumed
in the following analysis.
Designing Under Physical Constraints: Unit Widths An-a
Structural Bays
A key determinate in the layout of Lincoln Wharf is the
existing structural bays that cross the width of the
building. These measure 10'-0" center to center because the
cost of altering the heavy timber structural bays is
prohibitive. Modules of half bays, however, do work. Working
within this module, the available unit widths are 10"-0",
15'-0", 20'-0", and so on with half bays measuring 5'-0".
These unit widths when combined with the 43'-0" depth of the
building provide a limited set of options. These options are
indicated in Exhibit 9.
A survey of existing comparable developments has indicated
that the 15'-0" unit width(14'-0" clear inside dimensions),
is seen by the market as a marginal dimension. Carmine
Cerone, at Charles Place, found that a 141'-6" room width with
windows along the entire length to be the largest marketing
drawback for some of their smaller units. The developers of
Union Wharf, when building the new triplex townhouses at the
end of the wharf, were very concerned with the 18'-0" width
of these units(17'-0"+/-, clear). While the development was
successful, current owners note the narrowness of this
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Exhibit 9
Lincoln Wharf:
Possible Unit Sizes Given Existing Structural Bays
Floors Two, Three, Five and Seven:(no corridor)
Size Total S.F. Decks Total with Deck
15 x 43 645 113 758
20 x 43 860 150 1,010
25 x 43 1,075 188 1,263
30 x 43 1,290 225 1,515
35 x 43 1,505 263 1,768
40 x 43 1,720 300 2,020
45 x 43 1,935 338 2,273
Floors Three and Six: (with 5'-0" corridor)
15 x 38 570 113 683
20 x 38 760 150 910
25 x 38 950 188 1,138
30 x 38 1,140 225 1,365
35 x 38 1,330 263 1,593
40 x 38 1,520 300 1,820
45 x 38 1,710 338 2,048
50 x 38 1,900 375 2,275
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width. For these reasons and given the building depth, where
possible, the minimum width of any given unit is no less than
20'-0" or 19'-0" inside surface to inside surface. (It should
be noted that square foot calculations for sales purposes
will be based on dimensions taken from the center of the
demising walls and exterior walls and not inside surface to
inside surface dimensions.)
Project Plan: Unit Distribution Ann kix.
Like the Mariner and the other rehabilitated buildings in
the waterfront market area, the optimal market objectives
have to be tempered by the realities of existing structure.
While the desired unit mix, according to some brokers and
developers, may be approximately 20% to 30% one-bedroom units
and 40% to 60% two-bedroom units, with the remaining
percentage occupying deluxe penthouse units, the actual unit
mix and even the final unit count is subject to the market.
In other words, the goal is not to necessarily build 44 units
nor is it to necessarily meet a predetermined unit mix.
Residential And, Non-Residential Uses
The first floor is devoted to two uses. As has been
discussed, the city has required a minimum of one parking
space per residential unit. In order to accommodate this
requirement within the limitations of the wharf, eighteen
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enclosed parking spaces are provided on the south side of the
first floor. Given the market for enclosed parking -- $35,000
per space for an 9'x18' space or $216 psf -- this is an
efficient use of this space.
Two options have been considered for the north side of the
first floor. The first is to make 20'x23' bays which would
serve as a bedroom for the second floor, thus making a
duplex. The problems with this scenario are twofold. Public
access around the pier is mandated and a first floor bedroom,
no matter how sensitively treated, will have the perception
of being a security problem. Furthermore, the addition of 460
square feet to the second floor units which, as discussed
below, are targeted to the young professional market, means a
total square footage of 1,320. This unit size is far too
large for this market and a first and second floor unit could
not be sold to the "empty nester" and divorced persons
market.
The second option is to sell this space as office
condominiums. For the developers at Union Wharf and Lewis
Wharf, this has been highly successful with current per-
square-foot values ranging from $225 to $300, but residents
have not been pleased by this. At Union Wharf, this is in
part a result of office condominiums which have been sold on
the second and third levels of the building. At both
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buildings, the great majority of owners are small law firms.
At Lewis Wharf, these units are serviced by their own
elevator so that there is no overlapping of use. Lewis Wharf
also has retail space on the first floor. This use ranges
from the high-end furniture store, Roche-Bobois to a Store 24
on Alantic Avenue. Again, the residents have commented, even
more pointedly, on the unattractiveness of this use within
their building. The presence of retail stores is seen, by
some, as not compatible with the high-end image of the
development.
At Lincoln Wharf this space would work well with the
residential use as entry on the north side and the
overlapping of use would be minimal. The lobby would not be
shared and office users would approach the building from the
north side by the marina so that the overlapping of use would
be minimal. With a good view of marina, the spaces would be
highly attractive. Based on the broker's evaluation of this
space, per-square-foot values of $250 could be readily
obtained.
The residential floors -- two through seven -- are
organized on the principles set forth in the chapter on
marketing. As was discussed, the obvious relationship between
the floor the condominium is on, the views offered and the
selling price is direct. Five zones are identified in the
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building. These zones are defined by relative privacy, floor
level and views. The zones are as follows: 1. The western
inland end of the building faces the San Marco development
and has restricted views to the north and south. This zone,
which lacks privacy from the access street and the adjacent
moderate-income development, is defined by floors two through
five and by the enclosed fire stair required at each end of
the building. The fire stair on the harbor side will be
constructed on the outside of the building, attached by
bridges. 2. The second floor, between the west and the east
ends, is the next least attractive because units have
restricted privacy and views. 3. The midsection of the
building, floors two through five, will have good views which
improve as you go up and out towards the harbor. Privacy
will also increase as one goes up the different floors. 4.
The eastern end of the building, floors two through five,
will enjoy a higher degree of privacy than the midsection and
will have excellent views of the harbor. The units at the
very end will have unobstructed views in three directions. 5.
The penthouse units on the sixth and seventh floors will
have complete privacy and will have excellent views of the
harbor and the north and south waterfront. The stepped back
massing provides for very large decks for two units.
Based on the market analysis, four approximate ranges for
condominium sizes for the two markets are identified. The
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following sizes do not include deck/balcony areas. For the
young professionals, the range is between 800 and 900 square
feet. The "empty nester" and divorced persons market seeks
three ranges in the two-bedroom unit size. The smallest is
approximately 1,150 to 1,300 square feet. This size provides
for, in addition to the master bedroom, a very small bedroom
and den/study. The mid-sized range is approximately 1,300 to
1,500 square feet and represents a very generous two-bedroom
suite in all respects. Finally, the range with 1500 square
foot and above represents the top of the luxury market. These
ranges, when combined with the available unit sizes as
determined by structural bays, provide a limited but clear
set of options. The meshing of these pieces within the stated
guidelines has resulted in the following organization.
The second floor is divided into three zones according to
the aforementioned organizing principles. The western end --
the first zone -- has two small one-bedroom units averaging
790 square feet. These two small one-bedroom units are also
on the third, fourth and fifth floors. The eastern end --
zone 3 -- has two small two-bedroom units at 1,263 square
feet apiece(25'x43'). Because of the relative lack of privacy
and the fact that it is the second floor, the midsection is
occupied by six one-bedroom units totalling 860 square
feet(20'x43'). A summary table of all unit sizes, including
74
deck sizes, is provided in Exhibit 10.
Except for the western end, the units on the third floor
increase in size as the locational value has increased. The
overall average unit depth, however, is decreased five feet
by the corridor on this floor. The midsection is occupied by
four small two-bedroom units averaging 1,138 square
feet(25'x38'). The eastern end is, according to the strategy,
more ample with two medium-sized two-bedroom units averaging
1,365 square feet each(30'x38').
The fourth floor units are larger than those of the third
floor. In addition to the two one-bedroom units at the
western end, six generous two-bedroom units at 1,515 square
feet(30'x43') are provided. This includes an average 225
square foot deck. The fifth floor is the same as the fourth
floor.
The sixth floor, being the first of two penthouse floors,
has two large two-bedroom units averaging 1,620 square feet
at the eastern end. This is the first of the two floors which
step back. One unit has the rooftop deck of over 700 square
feet while the remainder of the floor is occupied by the
bottom half of four duplexes averaging 735 square
feet(20'x43' and 20'1x38' due to the corridor). When combined
with the upper half, which constitutes the seventh floor,
these units have an average total of 1,645 square feet, not
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Exhibit 10
Lincoln Wharf
Summary of Square Foot Calculations
Summary: % of % of
Total Total
Gross Net
Gross 67,795 S.F. 100%
Net Sellable 60,127 S.F. 89% 100%
Total Residential
W/0 Balcony 45,010 S.F. 66% 75%
Total Residential
W/Balcony 52,387 S.F. 77% 87%
Total Balcony 7,377 S.F. 11% 12%
Total Office 4,140 S.F 6% 7%
Total Parking 3,600 S.F. 5% 6%
Total Circulation 7,668 S.F. 11%
Approximate Unit Sizes and Distribution:
Number of Size Size Total % of
w/o Balc. w/Balc. S.F. Total
Floors 2,3,4 & 5:
One Bedroom 8 790 790 6,320 12%
Floor 2:
One Bedroom 6 860 1,010 6,060 12%
Two Bedroom 2 1,075 1,263 2,526 5%
Floor 3:
Two Bedroom 3 1,140 1,365 4,095 8%
Two Bedroom 2 1,330 1,593 3,186 6%
Floor 4 and 5:
Two Bedrom 12 1,290 1,515 18,180 35%
Floor 6 & 7:
Two Bedroom 2 1,620 2,020 4,040 8%
Two Bedroom 4 1,825 1,945 7,780 15%
Totals: 39 52,187 100%
Unit Count:
14 One Bedroom units - 35% of total unit count
25 Two Bedroom units - 65% of total unit count
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including the deck. It should be noted that the average deck
for these units is 415 square feet. Duplexed floors are used
for three reasons. The most important reason is their high
desirability by this end of the market, according to brokers.
The second reason is based on a combination of the stepped-
back massing requirements and the circulation system. Given
the objective of maximizing sellable floor area and avoiding
unnecessary circulation requirements, the duplex is a highly
efficient use for these floors. Lastly, with this
organization there is a decided marketing advantage in having
four units on the top floor instead of two flats.
Two problems arise out of this organization. One of the
compromises incurred in changing unit sizes floor by floor is
that the demising walls are not aligned vertically. This
creates a problem for the plumbing stacks which, for reasons
of cost, are best stacked vertically in straight runs.
Fireplace flues are considered an important market feature,
especially in the upper-end units. Erin Teach, the broker for
Church Court, identified the lack of fireplaces as one of the
greater drawbacks in the marketing of Church Court. Fireplace
flues require straight vertical runs. A number of solutions
are available. Stacks and flues can run up through units if
carefully done. This exploration requires the attention of
the project's architect.
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Summary
The relative efficiency of the described organization is
very good. Total circulation accounts for a respectable 11%
of the gross square footage. Of this total circulation, 25%
is occupied by the vertical stairs; these stairs add 3% to
the gross square footage and save 4.8% of net sellable square
feet. Of the total 69,113 gross square footage, 89% is
sellable. This indicates a highly efficient use of the
existing structure.
In terms of unit mix and distribution, the organization
is equally efficient. The market objective of obtaining a
unit mix of approximately 20% to 30% one-bedroom units, 40%
to 60% two- bedroom units and 10% to 20% penthouse units has
been roughly met. The unit distribution, based on the above
scenario, is 36% one-bedroom units, 47% two-bedroom units and
15% penthouse units. The high count on one-bedroom units is
due to the undesirable locations both on the western end of
the building and the mid-section of the second floor. The
unit mix within each of these ranges, while reflecting the
incremental increases in value as one goes up and out on the
building, provides a varied and positive set of options for
the market. Two sizes of one bedroom units and five sizes
of two-bedrooms units for a total of seven different unit
sizes.
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Finished or Unfinished
Luxury residential condominiums have been provided in the
Boston market in two fundamental ways. The traditional
approach creates a unit which is complete and ready to
occupy; the second produces unfinished or raw space, as was
done at Union Wharf. From a developer's perspective, this
choice involves not only questions of market demand, but
those of project and risk management. In terms of the market,
the issue is one of control, how much control the developer
wishes to have over the ultimate product and what is
necessary to achieve it. The following three sections address
each of the two options discussed above and the concept of
combining both approaches in single development.
As will be seen in the evaluation of the different
development scenarios, different returns on investment are
found not only between the different scenarios, but also
between the relative relationships among the different
partners. This is due to differences in equity contributions
and management fees. As this thesis is not an evaluation of
the partnership relationship and because the relationship
between the partners in the different scenarios does not
change substantially, the following discussions of
development returns assumes the position of the Kenney
Development Company, the active general partner. This
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provides clarity to the comparative analysis.
Finished Condominiums
Finished condominiums can be provided in varying degrees
of completion. In addition to the common practice of
providing 100% complete units, the luxury market units can be
provided anywhere from 95% to 99% complete. Often called
"designer ready", this approach provides the market with
the option to select out of a limited set of items, the
finishes for such things as the kitchen and bathroom floor
tiles, carpeting and paint colors. During the purchase and
sale period, these items are then selected by the purchaser
and the developer installs them. Completion of this work and
its acceptance by the purchaser occurs prior to the exchange
of title.
For the developer the central issue is based on the axiom
that, as the number of available choices to the purchaser
increases, so do the requirements of project management and
the potential for liabilities. On the market side, the issue
is one of expectations -- given the substantial purchase
costs combined with a high-end market that is accustomed to
having its desires met. This problem becomes less of an issue
as the value of the unit increases because, as Carmine Cerone
explains, "no options" is only an issue in the lower-end
units where purchasers are stretching their resources and
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cannot afford to make changes. In the relative high-end of
these purchases, the buyers can afford to make the changes
they desire.
Ian Market Perspective
Providing a finished condominium has several distinct
advantages to the purchaser: final costs are known, the date
of occupancy is assured, and most importantly, the ultimate
product is a given. The anxieties and difficulties found in
the design and construction process, is not added to the
already, often traumatic, experience of purchasing a new
residence. All of the liabilities remain with the developer.
As the total development is to be completed at the same time,
issues of on-going construction in an occupied building are
not present. The disadvantage with this traditional approach
is the sacrifice of control over the determination of how
the unit is to be designed and built.
ue Supply Perspective
The single largest advantage to the developer is the
increased profits from this approach. This is discussed in
detail in the following section. With these profits comes
increased risk and project management problems and herein
lies the disadvantages of this approach. Charles Place
provides a good example of the management problems incurred.
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As Carmine Cerone explains, early on during the presale and
construction period the developers were willing to make
changes for purchasers. This willingness, however, decreased
proportionately with the degree of completion and
responsibility was shifted to the purchasers. The problems
which prompted this declining interest were a result of
several issues. Owners, not understanding the complications
and associated high costs raised in making changes they
requested, became difficult. Architects and interior
designers hired by the unit owners, who were not from
Cambridge Seven Associates, the project architects, were
problematic in three ways. Some were inexperienced and did
not understand the design constraints presented by the
building itself. Almost all required repeated assistance from
Cambridge Seven Associates. This became a substantial burden
on the architect and the developer. Finally, these designers
and, most particularly, the clients had no sympathy for the
construction schedule and coordination requirements of the
general contractor, Turner Construction.
Turner Construction was a direct recipient of most of the
problems. Aside from managing a major construction effort,
handling the myriad of redesign issues in individual units
became an enormous problem. Fifty percent of the units made
substantial changes, 90% of which were done during the
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construction phase of the development. These changes included
significant alterations in the HVAC and plumbing systems
which directly impacted the construction efforts of Turner
Construction. For example, one unit owner who wished to move
the location of a half-bathroom within his unit, effected an
entire plumbing chase which serviced twenty other units.
Construction is a very linear process and deviations can
result in significant delays and added costs.
Other construction problems included a one-day strike of
union construction crews because a non-union truck driver
made a delivery to the site. On three occasions union
construction crews walked off the job because of non-union
crews hired by unit owners working within the building. This
resulted in tension with the unit owners who, not only had
contractual agreements and schedule expectations, but did not
want to pay the 25% to 35% higher union scale wages.
These and other problems forced the developer to change
course in the middle of the project. Schedules were developed
and deadlines were set. Owners were forced to make decisions
within specific periods of time or lose the right to choose.
This threat forced owners to act.
Four types of problems are identified from this experience
at Charles Place. The first concerns the sensitive problem of
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the typical unit purchaser's relative ignorance of design
and construction, combined with a determination to get what
they want and to have paid well for it. The second has to do
with the two scales of rough and finish construction
proceeding at the same time and the overlapping of different
unrelated architects and contractors on the same site. The
third problem relates to the developer's early willingness to
please without the proper safeguards. This resulted in high,
and sometimes unmet, expectations. While some of these
problems are unavoidable, in another project, several
measures could be taken to mitigate these problems and to
increase project control.
Eossible ProjeFt Control Measures Ear Lincoln Wharf
The first measure is to not have presales of condominiums.
For Lincoln Wharf, this choice is as much based on marketing
position as it is on project control. The marketing-based
decision not to have presales is discussed in the final
chapter. With no presales, project control is greatly
enhanced by minimizing change orders and allowing the
architect and general contractor to proceed unhindered.
Maintaining a degree of choice for the purchaser is a key
element in the marketing effort. In order to provide this
service specific items will be left incomplete; walls will be
primed but not painted and bathroom and kitchen tiles will
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not be installed. Final paint colors and tiles will be
selected by the purchaser from a preselected set of items
known to be in stock with identified costs. Items such as
kitchen cabinets, wood floors or carpeting will not be
considered because of the potential for complications and
delays. If the purchaser insists on a product not from the
preselected items, it becomes their responsibility to provide
a substitution at their cost. All choices must occur within a
predetermined and mutually agreed upon schedule. If this is
not done by the purchaser, they lose the opportunity for the
service and the task becomes their responsibility. A
reference list of contractors will be provided as a courtesy
only.
From the management perspective, this service will be
provided by a small general contractor or by a small team
from the general contractor for the development. All items
provided by this service will be part of a general contract
with the general contractor and will be bid as specific unit
items. In other words, the contract will include line items
for each possible selection so that all costs are known. This
allows the developer to give the purchaser a fixed and known
cost during marketing.
This work will occur after the 10% purchase and sale
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deposit so that in the event of default by the purchaser, the
cost of improvements will be more than covered by the
deposit. In order for the developer to be free and clear
once title is transferred, these improvements must be
complete. Delay of purchase by the developer because the
improvements have not been made or are unacceptable to the
purchaser, can give cause for delay claims or 93A claims
(product not as advertised). Any form of written conditions
which releases the developer from these conditions, such as
no guarantees, will not be acceptable to the purchasers or
their lawyers. The items provided for selection, therefore,
must not only have a required date by which time the
purchaser must select, the items available for selection must
also be limited in the number of trades involved and the
specific work required. Ample time for contingency purposes
must be accounted for in the scheduling. The conditions of
such an arrangement will be clearly acknowledged in a written
agreement between the developer and the purchaser.
Unfinished Space
Two luxury residential projects in Boston have been
developed offering unfinished space in the past five years --
Union Wharf and the Ritz-Carlton. Both projects provided
studded-out space with rough plumbing and rough electrical
services to the individual units. Lobbies, hallways,
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elevators and all other common spaces were provided complete.
In addition to the studded-out space, windows, exterior doors
and balconies were necessarily provided.
Vhe Market Perspective
The primary advantage to unfinished space is the unit
owner's freedom to design and build the unit as he/she
chooses. As will be discussed, the unit purchaser also has
the opportunity to make significant savings on the finished
product. While this approach allows great freedom, it
requires a very substantial amount of attention and work on
the part of the purchaser. An architect and contractor have
to be hired and managed. Small scale residential projects
with owners managing the overall process can be very
difficult experiences. Expectations are very high and there
are often problems with either the architect or the general
contractor. Because of this arrangement, final construction
costs are not known until after the purchase. The timing of
unit construction can come into conflict with the
construction of other units and disturb those already living
in the building. Issues of liability, in terms of the
building and the unit, are transferred to the unit purchaser.
Not being familiar with the complexities of residential
construction, these purchasers are relatively ignorant of the
various problems which can be incurred. In short, with the
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higher degree of freedom comes a higher degree of exposure
and risk.
These problems, while present, did not hinder the market
demand at Union Wharf. Of the five residents interviewed at
Union Wharf, of whom all are original purchasers, all felt
that they would do it again. While all of them mentioned the
unit construction as difficult and not unproblematic, they
found the experience of building their own unit to be
ultimately very exciting. The shared experience of the
purchasers collectively building their own units created a
sense of community in which people shared ideas and looked at
each other's condominiums. The very low turnover rate, as
discussed in the last chapter, is in part explained by the
high initial commitment required by building one's own unit
and the degree of satisfaction it creates.
Purchasing unfinished space requires acquisition and
construction loans. The loan required is essentially a small
developer's loan and banks can be highly resistent to provide
such financing. According to one broker, however, given the
high personal wealth of these purchasers, banks will be
accommodating in order to please substantial or potentially
substantial clients. The financing costs, however, will be
higher as the management requirements by the bank are far
greater.
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Ihe Developer's Perspective
This approach substantially reduces the development risk
in several key respects. The construction period is three
months shorter. Fewer trades on the site reduce the
potential for management problems and strikes. The
construction costs are reduced by 20% and the financing costs
are reduced by 29%. As the finish work is the most difficult
stage of construction to manage and the one in which the
greatest delays can occur, in that so many trades are
required, the liability problems of delay claims and 93A
claims are significantly avoided. While the sale of
unfinished units substantially reduces the legal exposure of
the developer, the developer still has the professional
reponsibility and the marketing incentive to maintain an
orderly unit-by-unit construction process within the
building.
Nevertheless, substantial problems have occurred with this
approach. The Ritz-Carlton, initially developed by Gerard
Blakely and completed by John Hall and Ted Saint-James
Raymond, had many problems, the largest of which was
obtaining a certificate of occupancy from the Boston's
Department of Buildings. Purchases of units were made at
different times and the construction of individual units
occurred at even greater intervals. Some people bought
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condominiums and then left the city for extended periods of
time. Not anticipating the need to fully complete the
sprinkler systems and to install all of the required smoke
detectors as required by the Fire Code and necessary for the
Certificate of Occupancy, the developers were confronted with
a major problem of having people ready to live in their
condominiums but not legally allowed to do so. All of the
condominium owners had to be contacted and arrangements were
made to satisfactorily complete the safety systems. This
problem resulted in a series of delay claims and 93A claims.
Union Wharf did not have this type of major problem; the
problems it faced were much more mundane -- damage to the
corridors, lobby and elevator from contractors, elevator
access monopolized by contractors so that residents were
forced to use the stairs, and so on. Getting materials in and
out of the building was eventually solved by the use of
cranes and "cherry pickers" which loaded materials directly
into the units from both sides of the building. Once the
building was relatively complete, the lobby, elevator and
corridors were restored.
All three brokers in the waterfront market area have
stated that there is a "definite" demand for unfinished space
and recommend this approach for Lincoln Wharf. The question
of what this market will pay, however, is much more
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difficult to answer with only two comparables in the city,
both of which are more than four years old. Relying on the
advice of the brokers is not reassuring as all three varied
in their evaluation of what was an achievable price. One
broker, who stated that the top sales price of $400 psf was
possible for finished space, felt that $250 psf was an
accurate estimate in today's market. The second broker was
less definite, claiming sales prices of $200 to $250 psf
were realistic. Assuming that $250 psf is the top sales
price achievable, this figure is 36% below that of the
highest sales price at Lincoln Wharf, $390 psf. The implied
per-square-foot reduction of $140 is very substantial,
especially when considering construction costs and the margin
of profit scarificed.
The construction costs and soft costs for finishing rough
space is approximately $45 to $50 psf for a finished
condominium of good quality and relatively high grade of
finish but with few customizations. This figure could easily
run as high as $75 psf for a condominium with luxury features
and a high level of customization. A figure of $100 psf is
possible.
Employing these construction costs in a cost/benefit
analysis and distinguishing between potential markets,
provides several key insights into the pricing of unfinished
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space. For the value-conscious purchaser, it is crucial to
the marketing effort to create a cost-saving incentive, given
both the merits and complexities of such an undertaking.
This, of course, is much less of a concern for the top-end
purchaser whose primary goal is to build the exact product
desired, to a certain extent regardless of price. Given these
characterizations and their associated per-square-foot cost
of construction of $50 and $75 respectively, and assuming a
$100 per-square-foot sales price reduction on the pricing of
finished space, both purchasers are given savings incentives
and margins for construction overuns. As you will note in
Exhibit 11, For a 1,000 square unit sold to a value-conscious
purchaser for $150 psf, this reduction results in a savings
of 20% ($50,000). For the high-end purchaser, who is
spending $75 psf in improvements, this reduction realizes a
savings of 10% ($25,000) for the same unit. When looking at
the most expensive units, in this scenario, of $290 psf, the
actual dollar amount saved is the same but the percent saved
is reduced in relation to the increase in total price. For
the value-conscious buyer the savings are 25% and for the
high-end buyer the savings are only 6.25%; the amount being
saved remains at $25,000. These are significant savings and
the sales prices are approximately 20% more than those
suggested by the brokers. When calculating the returns to
the developer, however, the $100 reduction on per-square-foot
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Exhibit 11
Cost/Benefit Analysis For Purchaser
Of Unfinished Unit At $100 P.S.F. Reduction In
Price From Finished Space
Savings Generated From Purchasing Lower Cost Unit:
--------------------------------- 
----------
Value Top-End
Conscious Buyer
Buyer
--------------------------------------------
P.S.F. Sales Price $250 $250
Finished
P.S.F. Reduction ($100) ($100)
P.S.F. Unfinished $150 $150
Construction Cost $50 $75
P.S.F.
Total P.S.F. Cost $200 $225
Unit Size 1,000 S.F. 1,000 S.F.
Total Cost $200,000 $225,000
For Unfinished
Total Cost For
Same Unit but
Finished $250,000 $250,000
Total Amount Saved
From Not Buying
Finished Space $50,000 $25,000
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sales prices results in a very significant 31% reduction in
the return on investment when compared to that for finished
space. For a summary see Exhibit 12. Please note that in
Table 6 the cost reductions and proforma assumptions for
unfinished space are carefully detailed. Summaries of hard
and soft costs are provided in Table 7.
When solving for a reduction in per-square-foot value which
gives the same return on investment as finished space to the
Kenney Devlopment Company, the value is $104- psf. In other
words, a $390 per-square-foot finished unit would have to
sell for $286 psf in order for the developer to gain the same
return on investment. The equity requirements for the two
approaches vary greatly, as may be seen in Exhibit 12. While
the return on investment calculations is an appropriate
measure for comparison because the equity requirements are so
different, when looking at the profits the distinction
between the different scenarios becomes even clearer. The
total return for finished space is $6,596,789 and for
unfinished space the return is $4,477,086, 32% less. When
calculating for the highest recommended unfinished sales
prices given by the brokers, the total return is only
$2,588,569, 61% less than that for finished space and 40%
less when calculating the return on investment to the Kenney
Development Company.
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Exhibit 12
Lincoln Wharf:
Investment Return Summary
Summary of Return On Investment For the Three Development
Scenarios
-------------------------------------------
Equity Gross R.O.I.
Return
-------------------------------------------
Finished Space:
KDC $303,665 $3,102,176 1022%
HCG $303,665 $2,859,229 942%
Limited $1,000,000 $635,384 64%
--------------------------------------------
Unfinished Space @Minus $104 P.S.F.:
----------------------
KDC $201,983 $2,079,090 1029%
HCG $201,983 $1,961,997 971%
Limited $1,000,000 $435,000 44%
--------------------------------------------
Unfinished Space @Minus $140 P.S.F.:
-------------------------
KDC $201,983 $1,229,257 609%
HCG $201,983 $1,112,164 551%
Limited $1,000,000 $247,148 25%
Note:
Lincoln Wharf Associates:(LWA)
-KDC - Kenney Development Company - 45% interest in LWA
-HCG - Harbour Capital Group - 45% interest in LWA
-Limited - Limited Partner - 10% interest in LWA
-For Proformas for the three scenarios, see Appendix
-For Proforma Assumptions for each scenario, see Table 7
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With the increase in profits, there is the increase in
risk. With unfinished space the construction period is
reduced by 20%, the construction and financing costs are
reduced by 30% and the equity reqiurements are 33% less.
These are substantial incentives, but in a market where the
demand is high and the supply is low, the developer can be
confident in assuming a higher risk profile given the
substantial profit incentive. Furthermore, without recent
comparables and given the need to create incentives, the
margin between what the brokers suggest and what is
necessary to justify the approach in terms of profits is too
great. The risks in this market call are far greater than the
management and liability risks found in the approach for
finished condominiums.
Finished and Unfinished
This option of combining both approaches offers the worst
of both approaches without the benefits of either. Offering
both types of units within the single development does not
solve the problem of building control either way. While the
number of finished units would be less, the developer will
not necessarily be out of the development any sooner. Selling
finished units in a building which will have ongoing unit-by-
unit construction for as long as two years will create very
difficult relations within the building, even if done
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strategically.
As has been suggested, the two approaches draw different
types of markets. The finished units will appeal to people
who are busy or do not have the need or desire to design and
build their own unit. Significant portions of this market
will have no desire to be associated with any construction
efforts. From a marketing standpoint, the development image
becomes muddled with these two markets desiring very
different products. These problems combined with the risk
found in the sale prices discussed in the last section
renders this approach as unacceptable.
Building Services & Amenities
At Charles Place, the Four Seasons and, more importantly,
at Rowes Wharf, the large luxury mixed-use developments are
providing a wide range of in-house hotel services to the
condominium owner. In addition to these services, such
amenities as swimming pools and health clubs are also
provided at Charles Place. It is not known at this time
whether Rowes Wharf will contain such features. In the
Lincoln Wharf market area, in addition to 24-hour security
and full-time building managers, these services have been
limited to valet parking at the Mariner and laundry pick-up
service at Lewis Wharf. Both Union and Lewis Wharves have
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small swimming pools as well Clearly, the overhead costs of
the large developments are great and far beyond the reach of
Lincoln Wharf, which is not part of a large hotel. Also, it
is decidedly not the intent of the marketing effort to
compete with Rowes Wharf.
Nevertheless, for the small but anticipated crossover
market from Rowes Wharf, these services will be a
consideration. More importantly, however, it is the intent
of the development effort to distinguish this development in
terms of quality from all others in the Lincoln Wharf market
area that have preceded it. From this perspective, providing
services is an important distinguishing feature. Rather than
provide in-house services, which is completely unfeasible,
relationships with outside facilities will be made. High-
quality catering, laundry, cobbler, maid, cleaning and like
services will have a structured relationship with the
deveplopment. An in-house facilitator, not the building
manager, will provide this coordination and management. If
dogs need to be walked or plants watered while residents are
away, this will also be done. A unit owner can also call this
facilitator and ask that dinner be arranged for the unit
owner and guests. Billing will be handled through the
monthly condominium association fees as an additional charge.
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There are a range of condominium fees in the Boston luxury
residential market. For a two-bedroom unit at the Four
Seasons, the condominium association fee is $2,000 per month,
according to the broker for the development. This fee
includes only the basic common area cleaning and maintenance,
plus access to the main heating system. Each unit has its
own electric meter. Valet parking is also provided. A similar
two-bedroom unit at Charles Place has a $400 per month fee
and provides essentially the same services but without
heating or valet parking. At Union Wharf, the fee is also
approximately $400 per month. Both local brokers and the
residents interviewed have expressed a concern about high
condominium fees. The assessment of the Lincoln Wharf market,
in this regard, is fairly clear. While people are willing to
spend substantial sums of money for a condminium, which they
see as an investment, they are not willing to pay high
monthly charges.
Calculating for the added cost of a facilitator, assuming
that Lincoln Wharf will have the same approximate association
fees as Union Wharf which has approximately the same land
area but more units, an annual salary of $25,000 is assumed
for a person. Considering overhead expenses and using a low
multiplier of 1.5, this cost is $37,500 annually. This works
out to $940 per unit per year or $78 per month. With Union
Wharf as a base reference, this would add an approximate
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average of 20% to the monthly association fees paid by unit
owners. This additional cost is not seen as any significant
encumbrance on the purchaser who is not interested in the
services provided, except possibily the young professional
market. While the fee is still well within the relative range
of comparable projects in and outside of the market area, the
ultimate decision of whether to provide this service, as it
could possibly impact the young professional market, depends
on interest rates and market conditions at the time of
maketing.
If one considers that eventually the condominium
association will decide on the ultimate merit of the service
within the building, once the building has achieved normal
operations, this issue may be seen as primarily a marketing
one for the developer. Half of the residents interviewed on
the waterfront stated a strong interest in such a service. A
summary of the decisions made in this and in the previous
chapter is made in the following chapter.
100
CHAPTER 4
SUMMARY AND MARKETING PLAN
The following chapter contains three sections. The first
is a brief review of the conclusions drawn in the preceding
two chapters. The second section considers the development
"image" and the market plan. Because the supply of housing is
sensitive to interest rates, this factor is also briefly
considered in this section. The thesis is then concluded by a
characterization of the development and its anticipated sales
prices in the larger context of the waterfront market area
and Boston as a whole.
Review
Chapter Three, The Market Context, discussed the rapid
formation and maturation of the highly desired luxury
residential neighborhood in the Boston's North End. This
growth and change has been a direct result of the market
area's highly attractive waterfront location and its direct
proximity to Downtown Boston's resurgent economy. The market
analysis of Union Wharf and Lewis Wharf confirmed this
perception of continued growth through the high rates of
appreciation found in the resales and the high absolute
sales values achieved to date. These sales histories, when
101
combined with the low turnover rates, confirm local brokers'
characterization of this market as one of high demand and
very limited supply. The ultimate success of the Mariner's
ambitious sales prices and their pricing strategy will
provide a key reference for Lincoln Wharf in the near future.
Chapter Three also reviewed historical and current demand
in the market area. Two distinct markets were identified and
characterized, the young professional, the "empty nester" and
divorced person. Two comparable developments outside the
market area were also reviewed -- Charles Square and Church
Court. These developments provided valuable references as to
what constitutes a luxury residential development in the
larger Boston-area market and how they have fared. This was
then followed by an evaluation of developments coming on line
on the waterfront in the next three years. Distinctions were
drawn between the San Marco Development and Rowes Wharf and
Lincoln Wharf. Finally, a pricing strategy was established.
This strategy and the other conclusions discussed above,
provided the base assumptions from which the development
scenarios in Chapter Four were established.
Four conclusions were drawn in Chapter Four. A
cost/benefit analysis of the addition of two floors onto the
existing coal pocket storage structure showed that this would
be a profitable option. A detailed assessment of the question
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of unfinished versus finished space determined that finished
space, while creating increased management and liability
risks, was ultimately less of a risk. This was due to the
higher profit margin found in the provision of finished
units. It was also because of the wide gap between the sales
prices suggested by the brokers and what the proforma
analysis determined was a minimum sales price in order to
gain the same return as finished space. A building
facilitator was determined to be a desirable feature in lieu
of concierge service. And finally, a critical examination of
the building's internal organization was made, based on
perceptions of the market and building efficiency. Having
established the broad principles for the project, more
detailed design conclusions were drawn regarding the
circulation system, the location of the lobby and elevator,
unit size and unit distribution. These conclusions were then
evaluated in terms of relative building efficiency and
financial implications.
The Market Plan
The intent of this section is not to review item-by-item
the many distinct features Lincoln Wharf offers. These have
been discussed throughout the thesis and reviewed above.
Instead, the intent is to identify the means by which these
disparate features come together in concert to provide a
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cohesive whole; a marketing "image" which serves to organize
all other elements in the market plan. Under this guiding
image, the market plan is established through the
consideration of presales, the identification of an agent to
handle sales and the marketing devices to be employed in this
effort.
The Marketing Image
As a member of the established and prestigious waterfront
community, the image of Lincoln Wharf is to be distinguished
from its predecessors in the market area by it's small size,
timber construction and intimate relationship with the
harbor. Physically separated from the busy traffic of
Commercial Street and the tumultuous goings-on of the city,
this small enclave offers the tranquility of the harbor steps
away from the North End neighborhood and Downtown Boston. A
resident of Lincoln Wharf can easily walk to work in the
financial district, the Government Center or go to a Celtics
or Bruins game at North Station. Unlike the urbane and
polished image of Rowes Wharf, Lincoln Wharf will be historic
in character and continuous with its surroundings. And unlike
the "brick and beam" look of Union and Lewis Wharves, Lincoln
Wharf will provide a more finished and sophisticated image.
Most importantly, however, the market is drawn to the
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waterfront by a love of the sea and the casual lifestyle that
it represents. To this market, Lincoln Wharf offers the
opportunity to realize the desire to live by the sea while
still working in and enjoying the benefits of Boston. Lincoln
Wharf will have a quiet demure and a sense of underplayed
elegance. Saturday afternoon attire is seen as casual
boating attire, topsiders and short-sleeved shits, rather
than the blue blazers found at some non-waterfront
developments. This sense of casualness and waterfront life
will be expressed in the architecture. The choice of
materials will be among the finest, but discreet in
execution.
The image of restrained elegance and waterfront casualness
will characterize the marketing effort. Brochures will be
elegant but underplayed. The sense of respite and discretion
will be emphasized. The waterfront location will be played
upon through the use of a sailing yacht for a sales office in
the Lincoln Wharf marina. The development will not be
advertised. This accentuates the exculsive and precious
character of the development. Carpenter and Company, the
developers of Charles Place, did not advertise for this
expressed purpose. As Don Zagorian, a waterfront broker,
observes, word will travel and the lack of advertisement will
add a distinct aura to the development image.
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Presales
Presales or limited presales are another device for
generating market interest. Limited presales, in particular,
can build market anticipation. The use of presales can also
limit profits and raise the specter of change orders from
purchasers, as discussed in the preceding chapter. In a
market where the annual rate of appreciation ranges from 20%
to 40%, presales can mean that potential revenues are lost
due to the high rate of appreciation during the presale
period.
When solving for the revenues generated by a presale
period, a number of assumptions are necessary. Given the high
rate of appreciation, a relatively short six-month presale
period is assumed in order to limit the risk from misjudging
the market rate of appreciation. The absorption rate of 2.8
units per month, calculated in Chapter 3 is also assumed. The
proforma for a six-month presale period results in a
significant 50% savings in financing costs but only a 10%
increase in profits ($554,130). This 10% increase in profits
can be easily matched or improved upon when calculating for
the rate of appreciation. On the other hand, while raising
the problem of change orders, the use of presales does mean
that the developer is out of the project six months earlier.
This is a substantial consideration. Because the profit
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margin between the two approaches is relatively close and
because this margin is a result of market conditions, the
ultimate decision of whether to use presales or not weighs on
the market conditions during the early construction period.
If appreciation rates are low and interest rates high, then
presales will make economic sense. In today's market they do
not.
An In-House Broker?
Who sells the development is a central question to the
marketing plan. A number of approaches are available. The
more traditional approach would identify one broker from the
local community to handle sales. These brokers are expert at
this market and provide an excellent resource. Commissions
from sales generated from other brokers would be split. The
total commissions for Lincoln Wharf at a rate of 5%, is
$845,426, or 16% of the total profits.
An alternative approach considers the hiring of an in-
house broker. This person must have significant experience
with luxury residential developments in Boston. Graham Gund
used such a person for Church Court and Bulfinch Square. The
broker was paid a regular salary with significant bonuses
based on the success of the sales. Even if such a person were
paid a total of $100,000 for the fourteen-month period, the
developer would save 88% of the proceeds that would otherwise
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go to the brokers. The advantages of such an arrangement go
beyond financial considerations. This person would have sole
allegiance to the development and would have an intimate
knowledge of the developer and the development.
There are problems with this approach. The Mariner went to
a Brookline broker, Condo World, to handle sales. Commissions
from co-brokering in the local community have been limited to
a low- fixed rate, by the developer. This has created
animosity among the local brokers. As these brokers are
influential, the potential for a negative market image is
great and could significantly work against the marketing
efforts of the Mariner. There is little question that any
choice will disappoint some local brokers. It is critical,
however, that co-brokering commissions for Lincoln Wharf be
on par with common practice so as to encourage positive
relations with local brokers. This approach will both
generate sales and reduce the money saved by using an in-
house person. Nevertheless, the money saved will be
substantial.
Interest Rates
The issue of changing market conditions is critical to the
marketing plan and to the success of the development as a
whole. Clearly, many of the assumptions discussed so far in
the formulation of the marketing plan are based on optimal
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market conditions: high demand, limited supply and interest
rates that have been in steady decline over the past few
years and are now at a seven-year low. In the Lincoln Wharf
market area the supply will continue to be low. What is of
concern to this development, is a significant increase in
interest rates over which the developer has no direct
control.
A substantial portion of the anticipated market demand are
"empty nesters" and divorced persons. The great majority of
this market is leaving homes in the suburbs or condominiums
on the waterfront to live in Lincoln Wharf. If interest rates
are high, this market will not be able to sell their existing
homes. As you will note in Exhibit 13, the cost of owning
the average condominium at Lincoln Wharf at current fixed
rates of 12.5%, with a 20% down payment is $3,414 a month.
Going from an interest rate of 12.5% to 13.5% adds $273 a
month to financing costs. Assuming the purchaser can not
leverage more than 20% of the purchase price, this 1% change
in interest rates requires an increase in income from
$135,194 to $146,000, or 8%. A two percent increase over the
current rate requires an annual salary of $156,000, or a 16%
required increase in salary from the base case.
While many of these purchasers have substantial equity in
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Exhibit 13
Lincoln Wharf:
The Impact of Interest Rates On the Average Condominium
Interest Loan Equity Monthly % Change in
Rate Amount Required Payment Monthly Payment
11% *327,774 *81,943 *3,005 -12%
11.5% *3,141 -8%
12% *3,278 -4%
12.5% " *3,414 0%
13% $3,551 4%
13.5% *3,687 8%
14% *3,824 12%
14.5% " *3,961 16%
Note:
-Quoted Averages are from proforma for finished space, see
Appendix for support data.
-Loan Assumptions:
-Thirty-year mortgage
-Base case interest rate is 12.5%
-20% Equity
-Average Unit Size is 1,309 S.F.
-Average Sale Price is $313 p.s.f. or $409,717
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their existing homes, which means that the quoted financing
costs represent a maximum amount, the real impact of
increased interest rates on this market is on the young
families who are trading up to the homes being sold by the
"empty nesters" and divorced persons. If this young family
market is unable to assume the increased financing costs,
then the "empty nesters" and divorced persons will not be
able to sell their homes and move to Lincoln Wharf. For the
young professional, on the other hand, there is a direct
relationship between income and the cost of financing.
Incremental increases in interest rates will incrementally
narrow the young professional market.
Clearly, if the market demand becomes soft due to a change
in interest rates, then the marketing effort will shift from
the confident and passive one described to a more aggressive
one. A more aggressive approach would employ advertising,
possibly an increase in the number of options available to
the purchaser and would even consider some form of seller
financing. This marketing position will be a function of its
competition and the exact market conditions at the time of
sales. If Rowes Wharf, for example, lowers it projected
sales prices as it comes on the market, so may Lincoln Wharf
in order to maintain its 10% to 15% pricing advantage. These
measures assume a moderate increase in interest rates.
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Once title is exchanged and construction begins, the
level of investment is such that there is no turning back,
the project must be completed. Assuming a more serious
increase in interest rates than that already explored, the
type of measures which serve minimize risk become more
substantial. A hard cost-cutting look at construction costs
will be made. Once again, unfinished space will be
considered. The increase in interest rates will create a
market which is much more interested in cost-saving measures.
At the same time and as we have seen, the developer, while
loosing potential profits with this approach, could
significantly reduce development risk. The construction
period would be shortenned by three months and the amount
financed would be reduced by 30%. Presales would commence as
early as possible so that purchasers could take advantage of
the most current interest rates. Again, as we have seen, this
would also significantly reduce the financial exposure to the
developer. Similarly, arrangements would be made to construct
the model showrooms and to begin the marketing efforts as
soon as possible. The type of measures employed in such
risk management, are necessarily a function of where the
development effort stands at the time interest rates
increase.
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Lincoln Wharf and the Boston Market
The relative positioning of Lincoln Wharf in terms of
sales prices and market image to comparable luxury
residential developments in the market area and in Boston is,
while ambitious, not at the very forefront. Lincoln Wharf
does not offer the luxurious services of the large mixed-use
developments, nor does it provide the height of prestige
found at the Ritz-Carlton. And unlike the positioning of the
Mariner, Lincoln Wharf is not seen as commanding the highest
sales prices in Boston, but one that assumes a very close
second position.
Lincoln Wharf will position itself, in contrast to the
comparable developments discussed, as a discreet but exotic
gem; the last and most treasured along the waterfront. This
positioning combined with the development image of restrained
elegance and casual waterfront living will clearly
distinguish Lincoln Wharf from Rowes Wharf. Lincoln Wharf's
top selling price of $390 per square foot acknowledges this
close second position by being 13% below the top selling
price of Bowes Wharf. This top selling price is 3% below the
top selling price of Charles Place and 8% less than that of
the Four Seasons. The unit mix is very similar to these
developments and provides variety in the size and type of
units.
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As with interest rates, the luxury residential market has
experienced enormous change over the past ten years. Over the
next two years, during the design and construction of Lincoln
Wharf, many of the conditions assumed in this thesis can and
will change. The ultimate sales values and absorption rate
achieved by the Mariner in the coming year will offer a key
reference to the Lincoln Wharf development.
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Table 1
Lincoln Wharf
Summary of Construction Costs
At the request of the developer and based on preliminary
design documents provided by the project architect, Notter,
Finegold & Notter, Inc., the Gilbane Building Company of
Providence, Rhode Island provided a line item estimate to the
Developer on October 9, 1984. This estimate projected
construction costs for the first quarter of 1985. According
to the developer, the rate of construction cost increases has
been less than that projected by the estimate. For this
reason, the estimate is considered valid for today's dollars.
In some instances, the estimate does not fully break-down
costs into distinguishable elements. For this reason, certain
gross assumptions have been made based on the construction
experience of this writer. The construction cost summary
below, breaks apart only costs which in some manner bear on
the subject of this thesis.
Summary:
Construction Totals:
Finished $7,475,288
Unfinished $5,146,965
Item: Total % of % Amount
Cost Total: Saved Saved
Finished: When When
Unfinished: Unfinished:
Demolition: $461,000 7%
Piles & Deck: $973,000 15%
Concrete: $1,427,650 23%
Masonary: $10,790 0%
Misc. Metals: $198,800 3%
Rough Carp.: $454,180 7%
Finish Carp.: $550,000 9% 68% $374,000
Caulking(68%): $7,480 0%
Roof & Flash.: $56,000 1%
Glass & Glaz.: $35,000 1%
Interior Fin.: $318,000 5% 75% $329,000
Gypsum: $262,000 4% 85% $222,700
Misc.: $20,655 0% 100% $20,655
Res. Equip.: $112,000 2% 100% $112,000
Elevator: $65,000 1%
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Table 1
Page 2
Item: Total % of % Amount
Cost Total: Saved Saved
Finished: When When
Unfinished: Unfinished:
---- 
-----------------------------------------------------
Plumbing: $320,000 5% 50% $160,000
HVAC: $319,000 5% 80% $255,000
Fire Protect.: $72,000 1%
Electric: $569,000 9% 65% $370,000
Site Imp. $60,000 1%
--------------------------------------------
Sub-Total: $6,292,330 100% 28% $1,753,555
General Conditions And Contigency:
Finished Unfinished
$6,292,330
(1,753,555)
Sub-Total: $6,292,330 $4,538,775
Gen. Cond.(8%) $503,386 $140,284
$6,795,716 $4,679,059
Contingency(10%) $679,572 $467,906
Total: $7,475,288 $5,146,965
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Table 2
The Following is an accounting of the brokers interviewed
for the analysis of the Lincoln Wharf Market Area.
Brokers:
Kevin Ahearn
Otis & Ahearn, Inc.
Altantic Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts
Roland Kelsch
Waterfront Reatlty, Inc.
Lewis Wharf
Boston, Massachusetts
Don Zagorian
Don Zagorian Associates, Inc.
Union Wharf
Boston, Massachusetts
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Table 3
LEWIS WHARF - RESALE PRICES OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS
Lewis Wharf:
L615 786 N 3/1/1 6 5.31.83 $142,500 $181 North End
L326 815 N 3/1/1 3 7.21.83 $160,000 $196 Marina
L314 1000 N 4/2/1 3 7.29.83 $155,000 $155 Marina
L622 973 N 4/2/1 6 8.2.83 $180,000 $185 South Harbour
L538 1320 small 5/2/2 5 9.2.83 $298,000 $226 South Harbour
L637 1064 small 4/2/1 6 12.2.83 $250,000 $235 North Harbour
L637 1064 small 4/2/1 6 12.2.83 $380,000 $357 North Harb*ur
L324 825 3/1/1 3 6.28.84 $150,000 $182 South/Marina
L617 786 3/1/1 6 4.13.84 $150,000 $191 North Harbour
L514 1050 4/2/1 5 current $235,000 $224 South Harbour
L435 1300 5/2/2 4 current $360,000 $277 South Harbour
L532 1170 4/2/1 5 current $400,000 $342 South Harbour
L431 1200 N/A current $372,000 $310 North/North End
L638 1064 N/A current $380,000 $357 South Harbour
Notes:
-Rehabilitated in 1974 and 1975 as finished space
-Buildinq completed and marketing started in 1976
-Sold out in 1978, eiqhteen month sellout
-Unit six: 40% one bedroom units, 60% two bedroom units
-Averaqe sizes: 50% of one bedrooms, 850 S.F., 50% 1,120 S.F., two bedrooms 1,300 S.F.
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Table 4
UNION WHARF - RESALE PRICES OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS
Unit #: S.F. Balc.: # of RasFlr.: Date of Total Sales Price Views:
w/Balc.: bedr./bath Sale: Price: P.S.F.:
------------------------------------------------------------
Union Wharf:
U607 1530 Deck 6/2.5/2 5&6 5.27.83 $340,000 $222 partial water
U302 1786 Y 6.5/3/2 3 9.15.83 $340,000 $190 city
US 2311 Y 6.5/3/2.Triplex 10.14.83 $460,000 $199 North Harbour
U23 2283 Y 6.5/3/2.Triplex 1.17.84 $450,000 $197 North Harbour
U18 2286 Y 6.5/3/2.Triplex 3.8.84 $480,000 $210 South Harbour
U7 2281 Y 6/3/2 Triplex 7.84 $500,000 $219 water
U18 2286 Y 6/3/2 Triplex 10.84 $575,000 $252 water
U27 2296 Y 6/3/2.5 Triplex 1.85 $825,000 $359 water
U503 1288 N/A 4/111 5 1.85 $262,500 $204 street
U607 1530 Deck 6/2.5/2 5&6 1.85 $455,000 $297 partial water
Notes:
Indented units have been sold twice in the past three years
Phase One - Unfinished Space Phase Two - Unfinished Space
-Rehabilitated in 1976 -Construction started in early 1979
-Presales began in the Fall of 1977 -Presales began before construction start
-Building completed in May of 1978 -Buildings completed in 1980
-Development sold out in summer of 1979, -Development sold out in 1980,
twenty-one month sellout twelve month sellout
-Unit six: 10% one bedroom units, -Unit six: 100 three bedrrom triplexes
90% two bedrooms -Average size: 2,300 S.F.
-Average sizes: 1,175 to 1,800 S.F.,
A few at 2,000 S.F.
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Table 5
The Mariner - Sales Price, Unit Size and Mix Analysis
Average Unit Size: 1,064 Square Feet Unit mix:
Average Cost(w/Balc.): $365 P.S.F. One Bed. 54%
Average Total Cost: $388,205 per unit Two Bed. 35%
Three Bed. 12%
Total # of Units: 83 units
Total S.F.: 88,344 S.F.
Average Floor Prices:(with Balcony)
Floor Two $265 Floor Seven $383
Floor Three $275 Floor Eight $400
Floor Four $303 Floor Nine $450
Floor Five $336 Floor Ten $500
Floor Six $360
Average Unit Sizes by Floor:(with Balcony)
Floor Two 807 Floor Seven 1,281
Floor Three 807 Floor Eight 1,370
Floor Four 772 Floor Nine 1,782
Floor Five 978 Floor Ten 1,764
Floor Six 978
Note:
-Summary based on data provided by East-Mar Corporation, the developers, to brokers.
Formerly Known as the Gerard Freezer Building
Located at 316 Commercial Street in Boston's North End
Presale marketting commenced on June 23, 1985
Completion Date: January, 1985
Ten Story Building
Total Commercial Square Footage: 27,794 S.F.
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Lincoln Wharf:
Proforma Assumptions
All three proformas have been constructed under the
following assumptions. Items which have been altered because
of the different development approach are noted at the end.
The proforma assumes 100% financing based on the
Developer's current informal understanding with financing
sources. As all calculations in the thesis are based on
current dollars, a 12% interest rate with a 1% financing
charge is assumed. It is also assumed by the developer that
the loan used during the marketing phase will be the same as
the construction loan.
As you will note, the soft costs have been broken down
into three columns. The first indicates the total anticipated
soft costs by the developer. The second indicates those soft
costs to be spent prior to the exchange of title and the
placement of financing. The exchange of title, the placement
of financing and the commencement of construction are all
assumed to occur on the same day. The third column indicates
the soft costs to be spent once construction commences. These
costs are included in the financing costs.
An accounting of the different soft costs is as follows.
Architectural and engineering costs are calculated as 5% of
the construction cost. Survey and testing, insurance, legal
and accounting, permits, marketing and real estate taxes have
been provided by the developer. Development management and
contingency expenses are 5% of the total development cost.
The cost of acquisition is also 100% financed. This is
clearly noted in the proforma. When calculating the
proportionate amount of soft costs devoted to each of the
forty condominiums and other revenue generating items in the
proforma, a figure of $749,792 is used for acquisition
costs. This figure represents 68% of the total acquisition
cost and is based on the percent of gross square footage
devoted to each of the two phases of this development. This,
and other square foot calculations are provided in the
proforma. This breakdown is also provided in the proforma
but is based on the total acquisition cost for both phases.
All square footage counts are based on the calculations for
Lincoln Wharf found in Exhibit 10, and those provided by the
architect for the second phase. The Proformas may be found
in the Appendix.
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The construction costs are based on the calculations found
in Table 1. The construction period for finished units is
fourteen months as provided by the Gilbane Building Company
in their constuction cost estimate.
The cost of the public contributions -- the linkage
payment of $475,000 and the fireboat facility for $70,000(as
estimated by the Gilbane Building Company) -- is considered
in the profroma breakdown of soft and hard costs. The linkage
payment is due in seven years from the date of designation
and the expenses for the fireboat facility is expected in two
years. The 68% share of these two items for Lincoln Wharf has
been calculated for present value at 10%. This is may be
found in the proforma breakdown of hard and soft costs. The
present value of these contributions is considered in the
calculation of total costs. The summary of hard and soft
costs found in Table 7 is based on actual development costs
and therefore does not include the cost of public benefits
but does include the full acquisistion cost.
Unfinished Space
The following items have been changed based on the
discussion of this approach in Chapter Three.
The construction period has been reduced by 20%. This time
saving is based on discussions with the Developer and a
detailed review of of the construction items affected. This
reduction in time is less than the cost savings for this
approach, 29%. This disportionate relationship is explained
by the large construction items which are not impacted by the
change in approach -- demolition and the reconstruction of
the piles and deck -- and the unchanged mobilization period
at the beginning of the job.
The change in construction costs is detailed in Table 1.
Other items affected include management fees which are
reduced from 5% to 3.5%, contingency costs are reduced from
5% to 4%, taxes during construction are reduced by 29%,
insurance by 20% and the architectural fee is reduced by 20%.
The disporportionate decrease found many of these items are a
reflection of the reduced economies of scale.
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Table 7
Lincoln Wharf:
Summary of Hard And Soft Costs For "Finished" Units
Total Cost P.S.F. % of Total
Cost: For Net Cost:
Sellabe S.F.:
--------------------------------------------
Hard Costs: 77% of Total Costs
------------------
Acquisition Cost: $1,100,000 $18 9%
Construction Cost: $7,475,288 $124 60%
Construction
Interest: $744,367 $12 6%
Marketing
Interest: $356,661 $6 3%
--------------------------------------------
Soft Costs: 23% of Total Costs
------------------
Marketing
Commissions: $422,713 $7 3%
All Other: $1,360,152 $42 20%
--------------------------------------------
Total Cost: $11,459,182 $209 100%
Note:
-Summary based on Proforma for finished space.
-The two following summaries are based on the two proformas
for unfinished space in the Appendix
-Per-square-foot calculations based on total net sellable
square feet as calculated in Exhibit 10.
-All cost quoted will be actual expenses. Future costs such
as public contributions are not included in the
calculations.
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Page 2
Summary of Hard And Soft Costs For "Unfinished" Units
At A $104 P.S.F. Reduction
Total Cost P.S.F. 5 of Total
Cost: For Net Cost:
Sellable S.F.:
---- -----------------------------------------------------
Hard Costs: 85% of Total Costs
Acquisition Cost: $1,100,000 $18 13%
Construction Cost $5,416,965 $90 63%
Construction
Interest: $412,560 $7 5%
Marketing
Interest: $233,507 $5 4%
----------- 
--------------------------------
Soft Costs: 15% of Total Costs
Marketing
Commissions: $308,064 $5 4%
All Other: $1,009,442 $17 12%
Total Cost: $8,210,538 $142 100%
Note:
-See Note on Page 1 of this Table.
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Page 3
Summary of Hard And Soft Costs For "Unfinished" Space
At A $140 P.S.F. Reduction
Total Cost P.S.F. % of Total
Cost: For Net Cost
Sellable S.F.
---- ----------------------------------------------------
Hard Costs: 85% of Total Costs
Acquisition Cost: $1,100,000 $18 13%
Construction Cost: $5,146,965 $90 63%
Construction
Interest: $440,867 $7 5%
Marketing
Interest: $319,732 $5 4%
--------------------------------------------
Soft Cost: 15% of Total Costs
Marketing
Commissions: $268,377 $5 4%
All Other: $1,039,272 $17 12%
--------------------------------------------
Total: $142 100%
Note:
-See note on Page 1 of this Table.
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LINCOLN UARF PROFORMA FINISHED UNI S PAGE IMMMMMMMMN,0MMMMM MMNNNNNM0MNNNNNNNNNNN55MMMWNOMWN,5
Last Revised: 6.16.65 ? Stories Total ovelopment Period: 28.25
Developomnt Costs Soft Spent Prior To be Spent 602-Lincoln 322 - North Cost per 2 of Total
Costs to Conet.$ begin'gw/ConsUharfs Ferrys Unit Cost
.... .... ... .--- --- ---- ---- --w - -  ..- ---- -.. ---- -.. ---- ---- --- ---- --- "-"- --"- -- " """" """
nequisitions "1,100,000 61,100,000 6749 792 9350,20@ 027,500 102
Arch4Eng .52): 0373,764 9260,323 693,441 69,344 32
Survey & Testings 9100,000 690,000 010,000 62,500 12
Insurances $25,000 925,000 $625 02
LegalSAccountings 6150,000 637,500 6112,500 63,750 12
Peritst 650,000 650,000 932,500 61,250 02
Marketings 6400,000 9400,000 610,000 42
Develop. Man.C52)s 6373,764 6149,506 6242,947 W9,344 32
Contingencies(52): 6373,764 9373,764 69,344 32
R.E.Tawee/Conmt.1 950,000 $50,000 -1,250 02
R.E.Tames/marketings 620,000 920,000 6500 02
Financing(x>1 69,354 669,354 62,234 12
- - - - - - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sort Cost: 63,623,622 9607,329 92,460,152
C(1,100,000),sinus Aquisition
Months
61,360,152
........... ...-. ...---..---- ==-------e
Hard Costes Coast per Unit As 2 of Total
-------------------------------------------------------------
Construction Costs 67 475,208 9166,802 66
Conat. Interests ;744,367 618,609 73
Marketing Interests 6356,661 0,917 3m
RquisitionsCLincoln) 6749,792 616,745 7X
Set Costs$
All Others 91,360,152 934,004 122
Merketings 422,713 610,566 43
Public Benefites 5234,270 65,057 2X
Totals
+322 North Ferrys
-Public Beneites
()
Marketing Costs: 2.502
Condowi niun: 6345,240
Marina 4 P.: 636,737
Orrices 640,737
-------------------------
9422,713
611 343,244
1350,206
(234,270)
011,459,162 Total Cost for Phase One
PROJECTED SALES PRICES FOR FININISHED UNITS
--..........--...-.........---..........-.-.-......-.--..-- 
-- - -- -. - -- - .-. . ---- *.. .. ". *
Tgpa e roteas.F.m/Balc Price P.S.F Aver.Unit Value Total
Second Floors
One Bedroon S 7,064 9220 0194,260 01,554,000.00
Tuo Bedroo 2 2,526 6275 0347,325 6694,650.00
Third Floors
One Bedroeo 2 1,500 9240 0199,600 379,200.00
Too Bedroon 6 0,034 6300 6401,700 62,410,200.00
---------------------------------------------
Fourth Fleers 46600
One Bedroon 2 1,560 9270 0213,300 0426,600.00
two Sedroow 6 9,090 6325 6492,375 92,954,250.00
Fifth Floors
One Dadroo 2 1,500 6300 6237,000 6474,000.00
Two Sedre* 6 9,090 9340 6515,100 $3,090,600.00
-------------------------------------------- 
---------
Sioth Floors
Two Sedroow
Botto of DupleW
2 4,040
2 3,740
9365 0737,300
6365 662,550
91,474,600.00$1,365,100.00
Seventh Floors
Top of Duple" 2 4,040 $390 6787,000 $1,575,600.00
-- ------------------- 
---------- ------------- 
- - - - - - - -
40 52,364 616,396,080
Average size or Unit 1,309.10 W.f. Average P.S.F 6313
------------------------------- 
- ----------- - - - - - -
-
- 111 e1 Min mi -
LINCOLN UNARF PROFRMA PAGE 2
Const. Per.: 14
Financing Empenses
Construction Period
------------
Const.Cost: 07,475,288
+Soft Cost: $1,360,152
+Aquisistion $1,100,000
-Equity ($1,000,000)
Loan Amount: $8,935,440
Interest Rat 12.00X
Points: 1.002
Ter"Cwonths) 14
Marketing Period
Loan Arountt$10,235,001
Interest Rat 12.002
Points: 0.002
Terw(nonths) 12
Market Per.: 14.25 Months
Area Calculations:
X of Total
S.F.
Gross S.F.
Net Sellable
Total Res. S.F.
M/o ealconey
Total Res. S.F.
M/Balconey:
Total Balcon
Total Office
Total Park.:
Total Circ.:
69,323
61,655
47,580
53,915
6,335
4,140
3,600
7,668
100x
892
692
78%
92
6z
52
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Non-CondoiniuN Revenues
--------- m-------m-- - .--.-.-..-------- ..-- .--- .--.---
Type: Pricing 0 of Avoer. Unit Value
OfficeC20w43 860 9 $215,000 Per Unit$250 P.S.F.
Parking:
Indoor $35,000.00 1S $630,000
Outdoor
Assigned $30,000.00 11 $330,000
Floating $25,000.00 11 0275,000
Marina Slips $30,000.00 17 $510,000
57 $1,745,000 $30,614 Per Unit
Square Foot Cost and Return Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------Building: Gross 2 of Total Net Sellable 2 of Total
Total Cost $164 $184
Const. Cost $100 662 $121 66X
Soft Cost $30 192 $34 192
Interest $16 10 $16 102
Building # Land, Pier and Maters 107,123
Gross a of Total
Total Cost $106
Const. Cost $70 662
Soft Cost $20 192
Interest $10 102
LINCOLN UNARF PROFORMA PAGE 3
MWMUMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMNWMMMMMINNMMNMMMMMMWMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
Total Developnent
.-...-. =.-.. -....... ......... . ...........--............-.-....--- --------------------
Building Land/Pier Marina Parking Totals x of
Area Area Totals
Lincoln
Uharf Net:
North Ferry
Net:
Lincoln
Uharf Gross:
North Ferry
Gross
9,lI 6,000 76,835
4,3; -0 6,000 22,65812,336
69,323 37,800 18,61[10
14,972 37,150 6,6C 0
125,723
58,722
22M
683
32X
Total Dev.
Net: ?3,993 13,5C 10 14,000 101,493 553 of total developed area is sellable
Total 0ev.
Gross: 84,295 74,950 25,2(10 184,445
Public benefits:
........... a. ...... a........ ~t.......--...-..--.---......-.-.-..--.----.-----
Costs
Contribution $4?5,000
Fireboat: 70$,000
Total: $545,000
Pavyent X Share Ne atS Share N.P.V.
Due Lincoln U. Lincoln U. 6103
- ==---=..----e----- ----- "
7 fEU $323,774 $169,334
2 feas $47,714 $44,936
$234,270
Equity Sourcess 3 of Equity 2 of Owner -slip
.-.- .- -.. -a.0 ... -------..... .. .. ..- . ...== -m....
KOC:t $303,665 192 *ia
NarbourC.wmM $303,665 192 dim
102 Liwited: $1,000,000 62 1.01
Totalt $1,607,329
m503 of PreConst. Bev. Costs
""Paid at Closing of Loan and emchange of Title,
Note: Developwent to be 1003 financied
Return to Lincoln harf Associates
-----------------------------.------------------.-----. "....*
Total s X of Total Entity Gross Return +Dev. Man. Total ROI
---------------------...----------.----....--...-------....----------.
*"."-- ---- ""*""""""""""""
$16,398,860 642
$1,452,737 73$1,536,737 82
$19,420,354
KDC645X $2,659,229
HarborC.3452 $2,859,229
Li PitedGl0 $635,384
$242,947 $3,102,176
$2,859,229
$635,384
1022Z
942%
64%
Sub-Totals ($11,459,182)
$7,961,171
Limited: ($1,000,000)
Generals: C607,329)
Total: $6,353,642
I-J
L0
Revenues:
Condosi ni us
Marina OP.:
Office
Sub-Totall
Costs:
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EXHIBIT 1 COST PROJECTIONS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
.--------------...--.--...-......--..--.------.----.----......---------...----------.---------------------.-----------------------
Construction Loan 58,935,440 $638,246 5638,246 5638,246 $638,246 $638,246 $638,246 $638,246
Acquisition Cin Loan)
Arch&Eng.(52): $93,441 $6,674 56,674 56,674 56,674 96,674 56,674 06,674
Survey & Testing: 510,000 910,000
Insurance: 525,000 5885 s885 S885 5885 $885 5885 $885
LegalAccounting: 5112,500 912,500
Permits: $32,500 932,500
Marketing: 5400,000
Developsent han.: 5242,947 $8,600 58,600 $8,600 58,600 $8,600 56,600 X8,600
Contingencies(Sf): 9373,764
R.E.Tawes/ConstaM.: 570,000 $2,478 52,478 52,478 $2,478 52,478 02,478 52,478
Financing(13) 589,354 589,354
Total Empandituress $801,237 0656,883 0656,883 $656,883 $656,883 5656,883 5656,883
--....-----...----........-................--..--..---.........------..-------.---.------------.---.-.-.-------.------.-.----.-----
EXHIBIT 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Construction Loan 9638,246 5638,246 5630,246 $638,246 $638,246 S638,246 9638,246
Acquisition
Arch5Eng.C52): $6,674 56,674 56,674 56,674 56,674 56,674 $6,674
Survey & Testing$
Insurance: 5885 S885 5885 S885 $885 5885 s885 5885
LegalAccountings 0,333
Permits:
Marketings 575,000 575,000 $17,544
Develop"ent Man.: 08,600 $8,600 50,600 $8,600 V8,600 08,600 88,600 58,600
Contingencies(SX)t
R.E.Ta.es/ConstOn.: 52,470 52,478 02,478 52,478 52,478 52,478 $2,478 $2,478
FinancingC1X>
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ *-----"--------"-Total Empanituress 5656,883 0656,083 0656,083 5656,883 5656,883 5731,883 5731,883 537,840
E------------- ........-..-...... . -... ----- 2... ..-.---------.....-.---------.-.--.-----------------------------
EXHIBIT 1 17 is 19 20 21 22 23 24
-- .-----------.-.---- ---------.---.--...--------- .- ..--- . --- - ----------- .-- ..---------- .---------- -- " ."- ."""--""*-""-
Construction Loan
Acquisition
Arch*Eng.(5)
Survey & Testing:
Insurances
Legal&Accountings
Per-its:
Marketings
Development Man.:
ContingenciesC53):
R.E.Tames/ConstAn.:
Financing(13)
5885
58,333
$17,54498,600
$2,478
5885$8,333
517,544
58,600
$2,4789
S885
58,333
517,544
58,600
52,478
5885
58,333
517,544
08,600
52,470
s885
58,333
$17,544
58,600
$2,478
588558,333
017,544
58,600
$2,478
s885
58,333
517,544
58,600
52,478
5885
58,333
$17,544
58,600
02,478
Total Empandituresl 537,840 537,840 537,840 537,840 537,840 $37,840 $37,840 $37,840
--------.....--........... ......--.... - .-.--.--.-.--.-----------------------------------------
EXMIBIT 1
Construction Loan
Acquisition
ArchkEng.523):
Survey 6 Testing$
Insurances
LegalSAccountings
Perits:
Marketingt
Development Man.t:
26 27 28 28.25
---- ..--- .---- .- ..---------------...-.-----.-.---------.
S885
58,333
$17,544$8,600
s885
58,333
517,544$8,600
S885$6,333
$17,544$8,600
5885$8,333
517,5449,600
Contingencies(5)
R.E.Taues/Constn.: 52,478 $2,478 52,478 $2,478
Financing(13)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(-J
LINCOLN MHARF PROFORMRA FI NISHEo UNITS PRGE 4 )
EXHIBIT Tuo FINANCING REOUIREMIEN CONSTRUCTION PERIOD INTEREST RAT 12.00!
=----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------**------------------e-------------==**e-----Mlonth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a
Beginning Balance s0 $809,250 $1,480,794 82,159,053 12,844,096 $3,535,988 54,234,800 $4,940,599
Pressle eene
Empenditures $801,237 5656,883 5656,883 1656,883 5656,883 5656,883 5656,883 0656,883
Outstanding Balance 5801,237 51,466,132 52,137,677 52,815,936 J8,500,978 54,192,871 54,891,682 $5,597,482
5terest 08,012 $14,661 521,377 $28,159 $35,010 541,929 948,917 555,975
---------- ==-------==--------------------------------------------------------------------*---------=--------------e----------"----End - Balances 5809,250 51,480,794 52,159,053 512,844,096 03,535,988 54,234,8900 54,940,599 55,653,457
-------------------.----.....----...-----. w---= --.----------------
EXHIBIT TUO
Month 9 10 11 12 13 14
Beginnini Balance 55,653,457 56,373,443 57,100,629 57,835,087 98,576,890 59,401,860
Pr-sal. euenues
Empenditures 5656,883 0656,883 0656,883 $656,883 0731,883 $731,883
Outstanding Salance 06,310,340 97,030,326 57,757,512 58,491,970 59,308,773 $10,133,743
Interest $63,103 570,303 577,575 584,920 593,088 $101,337
End - Balances 96,373,443 97,100,629 57,835,087 58,576,890 V9,401,860 510,235,081
------------- ==-------------- ----------- -------- --..-""..e**--**..... ---e....--*.. --------.......
EXHIBIT THREE SALES SCHE.: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
* of Units: 0 0 of Parking/Marina Units: 0 Price per unit
Sell Out Periods 12
Parkin/Marina 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Unite Sold 2.81 2.81 2.01 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81
Offices 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
-----------------------.. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT THREE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
4 of Units:
Sell Out Period:
Parking/Marina 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 1.00
Units Sold 2.81 2.61 2.81 2.01 2.81 2.81 2.81 0.70
Offices 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.16
-w---------e--------e------------------------------------------------.---=-----------------------------------
EMHIBIT FOUR REVENUES/CON"O SALECIn 7rketing period onjg Rverage Sale 5313.17 1,309.10
w-----w-----we----------------------m------------------------ -------*--e---e**-----e----------**-----"**--".-Month: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cash fro" Sales 51,150,799 51,150,799 91,150,799 01,150,799 91,150,799 $1,150,799 51,150,799 51,150,799
Lees Cornission(2.5X ($28,770> (28,770) (028,770) (28,770) (528,770) ($28,770> (528,770) ($28,770)
Cash BeforeFinancing 51,122,029 51,122,029 51,122,029 51,122,029 51,122,029 $1,122,029 51,122,029 51,122,029
EXHIBIT FOUR
--------------------------------e-- m --------------e---------------------- - =----------* -------- --*** *.....-....---.-.-
Montht 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
Cash fro" Sales 51,150,799 51,150,799 91,150,799 $1,150,799 51,150,799 $1,150,799 5287,700
Less ConnissionC2.5P (528,770) (528,770) C28,770) (28,770) (28,770) (28,770) C7,192)
Cash BeforeFinanciog V1,122,029 51,122,029 91,122,029 51,122,029 51,122,029 51,122,029 $280,507
H
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LINCOLN WHRRF PROFORMA FOR UNFINISHED SPACE 6 $104 PER SQUARE FOOT BELOM THAT OF FINISHED SPACE
Last Re.ised: 8.1.85 Unfinished Units 7 Stories Total Development Period:MO 25.25
Development Costs Soft Spent Prior To be Spent 682-Lincoln 322 - North Cost per X of Total
Costs to Const.1 begin'gM/Conslharf: Ferry: Unit Cost
"""""--""--e"-"e------*-*--..---.-----------------.------.-..-.---.---.----------.---...--------------------------.
Acquisition: $1,100,000 $1,100,000 $749,792 $350,208 $27,500 142
Arch&Eng.(43): $205,879 $154,409 051,470 05,14? 32
Suruek a Testing: $100,000 $90,000 $10,000 $2,500 12
Insurance: $20,000 $20,000 $500 0%
Legal8Recounting: $150,000 $37,500 $112,500 03,750 22
Permits: $50,000 $50,000 $32,500 $1,250 12
Marketing: $400,000 $400,000 $10,000 52
Oevelop. Man.C3.52) $180,144 $72,058 $117,093 $4,504 22
Contingencies(4%): $205,879 $205,879 $5,147 32
R.E.Tames/Const.: $40,000 $40,000 $1,000 02
R.E.Tames/Marketing: $20,000 $20,000 $500 02
FinancingC.): $62,564 $62,564 $1,564 12
Total Soft Cost: $2,875,867 $403,966 $2,109,442
C$1,100,000>minus Aquisition
$1,009,442
Marketing Costs: 2.502
e---------------------- ...-..-.---.-...--- 
- - --... .................---...............
Hard Costs: Cost per Unit As X of Total Condominium: $230,590
------------------------------------------------------------- Marina & P.: $36,737
Construction Cost: $5,146,965 $128,674 642 Office: $40,737
Const. Interests $412,560 $10,314 5X ------------------------------------------
Marketing Interest: $233,507 $5,838 32 $308,064
Aquisition:(Lincoln) $749,792 $18,745 92
Soft Costs:
All Other: $1,009,442 $25,236 12X
Marketing: $308,064 $7,702 42
Public benefits: $234,270 $5,857 3X
Total: $8,094,600
#322 North Ferry: $350,208
-Public Benefits: (234,270)
$8,210,538
PROJECTED SALES PRICES FOR UNFINISHED UNITS @MINUS $10 P.S.F.
Type 0 of TotalS.F.m/Balc Price P.S.F Aver.Unit Value Total
Second Floors
One Badroon 8 7,064 $116 $102,428 $819,424.00
Two Bedroom 2 2,526 $171 $215,973 $431,946.00
Third Floor:
One Bedroon 2 1,500 $136 $107,440 $214,880.00
Tmo Bedroo 6 8,034 $196 $262,444 $1,574,664.00
Fourth Floor:
One Bedroon 2 1,580 $166 $131,140 , $262,280.00
Too Bedroon 6 9,090 $221 $334,815 $2,006,890.00
Fifth Floor:
One Bedroon 2 1,580 $196 $154,840 $309,680.00
Tmo Bedroo 6 9,090 $236 $357,540 $2,145,240.00
Sioth Floor:
Too Bedroon 2 4,040 $261 $527,220 $1,054,440.00
bottom of OupleN 2 3,740 $261 $488,070 $976,140.00
Seventh Floor:
Top of DupleM 2 4,040 $286 $577,720 $1,155,440.00
40 52,364 $10,953,024
Average sixe of Unit 1,309.10 s.f. Average P.S.F $209
LINCOLN MMARF PROFORMR "UNFINISMED" PAGE 2
Conet. Per.: 11 Mlarket Per.: 14.25 Mlonths
financing Empenses Area Calculations,
Construction Period 3 or Total
------------ 5.f.Tta
Const.Cost: 85,146,965 ------------------------------------------
#Soft Costi 81,009,442 Gross S.F. 69,323 100a
+Rquisistion 81,100,000 Net Sellable 61,655 892
-Equity C01,000,000) Total Res. S.F.
Loan Aount: $6,256,407 M/o 8alconey 47,580 693
Interest Rat 12.00% Total Res. 5.F.
Points: 1.00% "/"alcony: 53,915 783
TernCoonths) 14 Total Baleen 6,335 9x
Total Office 4,140 6z
Total Park.: 3,600 5z
Marketing Period Total Cire.: 7,668
Loan Amount: s0
Interest Rat 12.003
Points: 0.00%
ferpCmonths) 12
Non-Condoiniue Revenues
T:pe: Pricing 8 of Aver. Unit Value
OfficeC20m43 860 9 0215,000 Per Unit
6250 P.S.F.
Parking:
Indoor 835,000.00 18 0630,000
Outdoor
Assigned 830,000.00 11 0330,000
floa
t
ing 825,000.00 11 8275,000
Marina Slips $30,000.00 17 8510,000
57 81,745,000 030,614 Per Unit
Square Foot Cost and Return Analysis
Building: Gross X of Total Net Sellable X of Total
Total Cost o117 8131
Const. Cost 874 642 863 64X
Soft Cost $25 222 $29 22X
Interest 89 e 910 8
Building + Land, Pier and Mter: 107,123
Gross 2 of Total
Total Cost $76
Const. Cost 840 64
Soft Cost 816 22Z
Interest 86 8
U
113
LINCOLN WMARF PROFORMRA "UNFINISHED" PRGE 3
----------------------------------.----------------------------.--------. -------------Total Doselopoent
Building Land/Pier Marine Parking Totals v of
Area Area rdals
Lincoln
Uharf Net: 61,655 9,160 8,000 78,83i ?8n
North Ferry
N.: 12,330 4,320 6,000 22,65*1 222
Lincoln
Uharf Gross: 69,323 37,800 18,600 125,721 682
North Ferry
Gross 14,972 37,150 6,600 58,72:! 32M
Total Dev.
Net: 73,993 13,500 14,000 101,49?; 552
Total Dev.
Gross: 84,295 74,950 25,200 184,44--1
Public Benefits:
Costs Pay"ent 2 Share Net 0 Share N.P.V.
Due Lincoln U. Lincoln U. 610X
-------------------------------------------------------------------.---- 
Contribution 3475,000 7 762 9368,950 3189,33*i
Fireboat: 370,000 2 763 354,373 344,93E.
Totals 9545,000 9234,27C1
Equity Sources: X of Equity 3 of Ownership
------------ .------- --. ---. --. -----. ---..-------
KDC:is 0201,983 143 45%
HarbourC.:ws $201,983 143 452
103 Limited: 31,000,000 713 103
Total: 31,403,966
s50 of PreConst. Dev. Costs
,,Paid at Closing of Loan and escchange of Title
Note: Dovelopfoent to be 1002 finencied
H
1~3
of total developed area is sellable
Return to Lincoln 1',arf Associates
. --.. - To-..---.3 --. of-T-ta
Total is a of Total
--.-..--.. --------.-.... -----.--
Reuenues:
Condowiniuw $10,953,024 783
Marina &P.: 31,432,737 10
Office 31,588,737 113
Sub-Totals 313,974,498
Costs:
Sub-Total: C36,210,538)
35,763,960
Liwited: C31,000,000)
GeneralS (403,966)
Total: 34,359,994
Entity Gross Retur -n es. Man. Total
K0C§452 1, 961, 997' 3117,093 32,079,091
NarborC.8452 1,961,997' $1,961,997
Liwited6103 0435,99%9 $435,999
ROT
10292
971X
442
..------ ..-.---------- ...-- - - - - -. --.I - ---. .- .- .--- ------.-..------------n. . .--.
---
LINCOLM UHARF PROFORA "UWFINISHED" PAGE 4
.. ....-.... w--.........-.=.-----==..=..........===---- .........----.---- w --------------- --------------- --------------- ENHISIT 1 COST RoJECTIONS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Construction, Loan $6,256,407 $568,764 $568,764 $568,764 1458,764 $568,764 $568,764 $568,764
Acquisition (in Loan)
Arch&Eng.C52): $51,470 $4,679 $4,679 $4,679 14,679 $4,679 $4,679 $4,679
Survey & testing2 $10,000 $10,000
Inusance: $20,000 $792 $792 $792 $792 $792 $792 $792
LegaMSAccountings $112,500 $12,500
Perwits: $32,500 $32,500
Marketings $400,000
D aleeoppent Man.: $117,093 $4,637 $4,637 $4,637 14,637 $4,637 $4,637 04,637
ContingenciewC53> $205,879
A.E.tae=/CenstfM.I $60,000 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 32,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376
FinencingC12) $62,564 $62,564
Total Empenditures: $698,813 $581,249 $561,249 $:%1,249 $581,249 $581,249 $581,249
................. ...................... I...ww...-...==.......-.....=--........===....w....=...==.......-.---=----=...-ww.---.
EMMIBIT 1 $ 9 10 11 12 13 14
----- ----===.-- -- - ===--=-=---- ; - --== -==...- ===-; ===.....-;---..-- --- ; =======--. ;-----==--------
ConstBruction Loan $568,764 $568,764 $568,764 $568,764
Requisition
Arch3Eng.C52)2 $4,679 $4,679 $4,679 $4,679
Survey a Testinge
Insurance: $792 9792 $792 $792 9792 $792 $792
Legal Accounting: 37,018 $7,018 $7,018
Pe.its:
Marketing: $75,000 $75,000 017,544 $17,544 $17,544
Deuelopnent Man.1 $4,637 $4,637 $4,637 $4,637 04,637 $4,637 $4,637
ContingenciewC5m>1
R.E.toaes/CenstM.I $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376
Financing(12>
To
t
al Espenditures: $581,249 $581,249 $656,249 $656,249 952,367 $32,367 $32,367
==.t r u"w--= ' m ,L---4"-----w---- -------- -------- ---=---------------------------.------.--..--------------.--------.------EMHIITI1 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Construction Loan
Acquisition
Arch*Eng.(52):
Survey & testing:
Insurance: $792 $792 $792 $792 $792 $792 $792
L gaI Accounting $7,018 97,018 $7,018 $7,018 37,018 $7,018 $7,018
P.er"its:
Marketing $17,544 $17,544 $17,544 917,544 17,544 $17,544 $17,544
,evelopwent Man.$ $4,637 $4,637 $4,637 $4,637 $4,637 $4,637 $4,637
Contingencies()I
R.E.Taue=/Cnst$M.2 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376
Financing(1>
Total Empenditures: $32,367 932,367 $32,367 $32,367 052,367 $32,367 $32,367
-................. ..................=== -....www-.......www~ .==-. ..w-......=-.-...--...====-===-.*=-..--
===.w.=========.....==.......=..==....=..== ======..=.. ...... m.....EMMISIT 1 22 23 24 25 25 25
Construction Loan
Acqui si ti on
ArchEn. C52S
Survey & Testing:
Insurancex $792 $792 $792 $792 $198
Lega14Re ountings $7,018 $7,018 $7,018 $7,018 D1,754
Pernits:
Marketings $17,544 $17,544 $17,544 $17,544 04,386
0Deveopment Nan.: 94,637 $4,637 $4,63? $4,637 31,159
ContingenciesC5)1
R.E.Taws/Const4.: $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $2,376 $594
Financi ng( 13)
total Espenditures: $32,367 $32,367 $32,367 $32,367 $8,092
===..--============..=........==-......==.....-=................-...................
H
Li)
LINCOLN WHARF PROFORMA "UNFINISHED" PAGE 5
------------------------------------..-...-.........-.-.-..--.--. I..... -. -----.. --------. -. -..... --. ----. -----.. -.. --. ---.. - --.. --.
EXHIBIT TUO FINANCING REGUIREMEN CONSTRUCTION PERIOD INTEREST RAT 12.002
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Beginning Balance s0 $705,801 $1,299,921 01,899,981 $2,506,043 $3,118,165 53,736,408
Presale Revenues
Ependitures $698,813 $581,249 $581,249 1581,249 $581,249 $581,249 $581,249
Outstanding Balance $698,813 $1,287,050 $1,881,170 $:2,481,230 $3,087,292 $3,699,414 $4,317,657
Interest $6,988 $12,871 $18,812 $24,812 $30,873 $36,994 $43,177
End - Balance: $705,801 $1,299,921 $1,899,981 0:2,506,043 $3,118,165 $3,736,408 $4,360,833
EXHIBIT TIO
--..---------------.-------------------------------------------...---------Month 8 9 10 11
Beginning Balance $4,360,833 $4,991,503 95,628,480 56,347,576
Presale Revenues
Empenditures $561,249 $581,249 $656,249 $656,249
Outstanding Balance $4,942,082 95,572,752 $6,284,729 97,003,825
Interest $49,421 $55,728 $62,847 $70,038
End - Balance: $4,991,503 $5,628,480 $6,347,576 $7,073,863
--------------------.---------...---------- =ww.-------------------------.
EXHIBIT THREE SALES SCHED.: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
* of Unita: 0 S of Parking/Marina Units: 0 Price per unit
Sell Out Period: 12
Parking/Marina 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Units Sold 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81
Offices 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
------------------------.---------------------....-------....-------------------------------......--------------------....-----
ExHIBIT THREE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
$ of Units:
Sell Out Period:
Parking/narine 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 1.00
Units Sold 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.81 2.01 2.81 0.70
Offices 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.16
-.----------------------------------------------..---------...-----------------------------.-----------------------
EXHIBIT FOUR REVENUES/CONDO SALE(In marketing period only) Average Sale $209.17 1,309.10
Month: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cash from Sales $768,633 $768,633 $768,633 $768,633 $768,633 $768,633 $768,633 $768,633
Less Comnission(2.5Y ($19,216) C$19,216> ($19,216> C$19,216> ($19,216> (019,216> ($19,216) C$19,216>
Cash BeforeFinencing $749,417 $749,417 $749,417 $749,417 $749,417 $749,417 $749,417 $749,417
-------------------.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EXHIBIT FOUR
Month: 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
Cash fro" Sales $768,633 $768,633 $768,633 $768,633 $768,633 $768,633 $192,158
Less CovnissionC2.5Z C$19,216) ($19,216> ($19,216) C19,216) ($19,216) ($19,216) ($4,804)
-Cashefo inancig 749,47 749,47 79,4 749,41 749,1 749,47,5-------------------------------- 4
Cash Befc,-eFi nancing $7.49,417 $749,.417 $749,417 $749,417 $7,49,417 $749,417 $187,354
c-J
LINCOLN UHRRF PROFORMR "UNFINISHED" PAGE 6
.-- --- --- --- --- ---   - ---- --- --- --------- --- --- --- --- --- --- -----------------EXMIBIT FIVE REVENUES FR0MPRRKING S MiARINA SLIPS Average Sale 930,614
--..---.....----.-----....... -------.--.... ----...------ w...-.- --....--.--...-...--------------- .--.---- ...-------Mlonth: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cash -ro, -Sales 9122,456 122,456 122,456 9122,456 9122,456 9122,456 9122,456 122,456
Lescmnission(2.5X) (93,061) <93,061) (93,061) (03,061) ($3,061) ($3,061) ($3,061) C$3,069
Cash BeforFinancing $119,395 *119,395 9119,395 $119,395 $119,395 0119,395 0119,395 $119,395
EXHIBIT FIVE
----------------- ~w.-----------------------------------------------------------------------------w--------------
Monthi 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
Cash fro. Sales 9122,456 9122,456 9122,456 9122,456 9122,456 $122,456 $30,614
L.ssCowisinC2.55> ($3,061) ($3,061) ($3,061) C$3,03,06C3,061) C93,061) ($765)
Cash BeforeFinancing 9119,395 9119,395 0119,395 9119,395 $119,395 $119,395 $29,849
w--------------------- ------===--------ee=-wm..w. -.......---------------w..------------------.-----------
ENHIBIT SIN REVENUES: OFFICES
M.onth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cash fro. Sales 9135,799 9135,789 9135,799 9135,799 $135,789 $135,789 $135,799 $135,789
LessCowmissionC2.52) (93,395) (3,395) C$3,395) ($3,395) C$3,395) (03,395) ($3,395) (X3,395)
Cash BeforeFinancing 9132,395 9132,395 S132,395 9132,395 $132,395 S132,395 $132,395 $132,395
--------------------- - -- -- - - - -- -- -- -- -- - -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- - --- - -- --
EXMIBIT SIN
-----.-------------------.----------------.-------.---I---------------------------------------------------------------Mlonth: 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
Cash fro" Sales 9135,799 $135,799 9135,789 0135,789 9135,709 9135,789 933,947
LessConcission(2.52) ($3,395) (93,395) ($3,395> ($3,395) ($3,395) (93,395) (9049)
Cash BeforeFinancing 9132,395 9132,395 $132,395 $132,395 $132,395 $132,395 933,099
EXHIBIT SEVEN FINANCING REQ.'s: MARKETING PERI00 INTERE~t RAT 12.003
------------------------------- ==--------------e---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a
Beginning Balance (97,073,063) C6,166,073) C$!,249,206)(04,323,170)03,397,873) (02,443,224) C1,489,128) ($525,491)
Net Sales Revenues 91,001,207 91,001,207 01,001,207 91,001,207 $1,001,207 91,001,207 91,001,207 91,001,207
Empenditures (932,367) (932,367) (032,367) (932,367) ($32,367) (932,367) (932,367) (932,367)
Outstanding Balance C96,105,023) C5,197,234> C9'1,290,366)(93,354,330)C02,419,033) (91,474,384) ($520,288) $443,349
Interest C$61,050) (951,972) (942,804) (033,543> (924,190) (014,744) ($5,203) s0
End Balense (6,166,073) C5,249,206) ($11,323,1703C$3,387,673)(92,443,224) (91,499,128) ($525,491> $443,349
.- ....= .-- .. .. .------.-.---.-.--.---- ...= ..-.- ...---- I--------. -. -.... ----... ------------------... --... -.. -. ----------. --.... -. --. -=
EXMIBI T SEVEN FINANCING REO. *s
..----.-- ....-.--- ......-----------------------;= ==----===-w------------------....; ..... ; ..... ; .. .. ;.....Month: 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
Beginning Balance 9443,349 91,412,199 92,361,029 93,349,969 94,319,709 95,297,549 96,256,388
Net Sles Revenues 91,001,207 $1,001,207 91,001,207 91,001,207 91,001,20? $1,001,207 $250,302
Empenditures C932,367) (932,367) C32,367> C32,367) ($32,367) C032,367) (0,092)
Outstanding Balance 91,412,199 92,381,029 9!,49,068 94,318,709 95,287,549 96,256,38 96,499,599
Interest 90 90 90 s0 90 90 90
End Balance 91,412,199 92,391,029 93,349,869 94,318,709 95,287,549 96,256,38 96,499,599
.-........-........-----..----------------------------.---
*"-----"""--"---"""""-"""
LINCOLN HARF PROFORMA UNFINISED UNITS Soinus 5140 pst FROM FINISHED UNITS PAGE 1
La0t Revised: 8.13.85 7 Stories Total vOelopent Period: 25.25
Development Costs Soft Spent Prior To be Spent 682-Lincoln 322 - North Cost per 2 of Total
Costs to Const.: begin'g/ConsUharf: Ferry: Unit Cost
-quisition: 51,100,000 51,100,000 -749,792 5350,208 527,500 142
ArchSEng.C42)1 5205,879 $154,409 $51,470 $5,14? 32
Survey S TestingS $100,000 590,000 $10,000 $2,500 12
Insurance: $20,000 $20,000 $500 02
Lega)SAccountings 5150,000 537,500 5112,500 53,750 22
Perwits: $50,000 550,000 $32,500 51,250 12
arketing: 5400,000 $400,000 510,000 52Develop. Man.(3.52) S180,144 572,058 5117,093 54,504 22
Contingencies(42): 5205,679 5205,879 $5,14? 32
R.E.Tamas/Const.: 540,000 $40,000 51,000 02
R.E.Teces/MArketing: $20,000 520,000 $500 02
Financing(2): 562,564 562,564 $1,564 12
Total Soft Costs 52,875,867 5403,966 52,109,442
(1,100,000)oinus Aquisition
$1,009,442
Marketing Costs: 2.50%
Hard Costs: Cost p.er Unit As 2 of Total
-------------------------------------------------------------
Contruction Costs 55,146,969 0128,674 642
Const. Interests 5412,560 $10,314 52
Marketing Interest: 9276,600 $6,915 32
AquisitionsCLincoln) 5749,792 518,745 92
Soft Costs:
All Other: 1,009,442 525,236 122
Marketing: $268,37? 56,709 3
Public Senefits: 9234,270 $5,857 3X
Totals 98,095,013
*322 North Ferry: 5350,200
-Public Benefits: ($234,270)
Cy 8,213,95l
Condominium: $190,904
Marina & P.: 536,737
0 fice: 040,73?
------------------------------------------
$268,377
PROJECTED SALES PRICES
TYpe of Tota15.F.N/Bale Price P.S.P Aver.Unit Yalue Total
Second Floor:
One Sedrooc 6 7,064 080 $70,640 0565,120.00
Two bedroom 2 2,526 5135 0170,505 5341,010.00
Third Floor:
One Bedroo 2 1,560 5100 579,000 $158,000.00
Two Bedroow 6 8,034 "160 5214,240 $1,285,440.00
Fourth Floors
One Sedroow 2 1,560 5130 0102,700 $205,400.00
To bedroom 6 9,090 5185 5280,275 $1,681,650.00
fifth Floor:
One Sedroon 2 1,560 5160 5126,400 $252,800.00
Too Bedroow 6 9,090 5200 5303,000 $1,818,000.00
Sioth Floor:
Too Bedroom 2 4,040 $225 5454,500 $909,000.00
bottom of Ouplew 2 3,740 5225 0420,750 0841,500.00
Seventh Floors
Top of Duplem 2 4,040 $250 $505,000 $1,010,000.00
40 52,364 59,067,920
Average size of Unit 1,309.10 s.f. Average P.S.F 5173
LINCOLN MHARF PROFORMA PAGE 2
Const. Per.: 11
Financing Empenses
Construction Period
-------------
Const.Cost: 95,146,965
+Sft Costs 51,009,442
*Rquisistion: 01,100,000
-Equity C1,000,000)
Loan Aount: 56,256,407
Interest Rate: 12.002
Points: 1.002
TermCmonths): 14
Market Par.: 14.25 Months
Area Calculations:
x of Total
S.F.
--------------------------------------- -----
Groe S.F. 69,323 1002 -Met Sellable 61,655 692
Total Rev. S.F.
w/o balconey 47,580 69a
Total Res. S.F.
N/5Balconeys 53,915 78
Tot1 balcon 6,335 92
Total Office 4,140 6X
Tota1 Park.: 3,600 52
Marketing Period Total Circ.: 7,668
Loan Aount: s0
Interest Rate: 12.003
Pointa: 0.003
TermConths)3 12
Non-CondoniniuN Revenues
: Pricing 5 of Aer. Unit Value
Office(20N43) 860 9 $215,000 Per Unit
5250 P.S.F.
Parking:
Indoor 535,000.00 lo 5630,000
Outdoor
Assigned $30,000.00 11 9330,000
Floating 525,000.00 11 5275,000
Marina Slips 530,000.00 17 5510,000
---------------------------------------- 
------ -P Ui5? 51,745,000 530,614 Per Unit
Square Foot Cost and Return Analysis
building: Gross 3 of Total Net Sellable 2 of Total
Total Coat 5117 5131
Const. Cost 574 64Z 583 643
Soft Cost 525 223 529 223
Interest 510 92 o11 9z
Building + Land, Pier end Mater: 107,123
Gross 2 of Total
Total Cost 976
Const. Cost 540 643
Soft Cost 516 222
Interest 56 92
112
H_
Ht
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MMNMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMNNMMMMMMMMMMNMMNNMMMMMMMMMMNMMNMMMMMMNNNNMMMMNMMMMMMMMMMMMMNNMMMM
Total Developoent
Building Land/Pier farina Parking Totals 3 of
Area Area Totals
Lincoln
Wharf Nett 61,655 9,180 8,000 78,835 78
North Ferry
Net: 12,338 4,320 6,000 22,658 22X
Lincoln
Uharf Gross: 69,323 37,800 18,600 125,723 683
North Ferry
Gross 14,972 37,150 6,600 50,722 32M
Total Dow.Net: 73,993 13,500 14,000 101,493 553 of total doeeloped area is sellable
Total Dev.
Gross: 84,295 74,950 25,200 184,445
Public Benefits:
Costs Pajont X Share Net 8 Shr N.P.V.
Due Lincoln U. Lincoln U. 8103
Contributions 8475,000 783 6368,958 9189,334
Fireboat: 870,000 2 78 $54,373 844,936
Total: "545,000 $234,270
Equity Sourcess X of Equity X of Ownership
KOC:: -201,983 14 45
HarbourC.1 11201,983 142 453
102 Linitedtmw $1,000,000 713 103
Total: 81,403,966
N503 of PreConst. Deu. Costs
wmPaid at Closing of Loan and eochange of Title
Note: Developmeent to be 1002 financied
Return to Lincoln Uharf Associates
Total * x of Total Entity Gross Return +De. Man. Total ROl
H
kNb
KDCO99,067,920 753 Herb
81,432,737 123 Liwi
81,568,737 133
912,069,394
(18,213,951)Total Costs
83,875,443
(1,000,000)Paid back to Limited Partner
(0403,966>
$2,471,477
453 81,112,164 8117,093 81,229,258
orC.8452 $1,112,164 S1,112,164
tedOlOX 0247,148 8247,148
Revenues a
Condoniniuw
Marina &P.2
Office
Sub-Total:
Costs:
Sub-Totals
Liited:
Generals,
Total:
6093
551%
25X
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-------.--------------ftf------------.------.--------------------------------------.------.-------..-.-----..--------..---------..-----
ENHIBIT I COST PROJECTIONS 1' 2 3 4 5 6 ?
-..-------..-----------..----.---.----- w.------------------------..---.-............--..........---....------....------.--.-.---.
Construction Loan 96,256,407 9568,764 9568,764 9568,764 $568,764 9568,764 $568,764 568,764
cquisition (in Loan)
Prch4EnZ. C52): $51,470 94,679 94,679 $4,679 94,679 94,679 $4,679 94,679
Survey Testings 910,000 $10,000
Insurance: $20,000 0792 9792 9792 $792 9792 $792 9792
LegalAccountingi 9112,500 $12,500
Peri9t: 032,500 932,500
Marketingt 9400,000
Developoent Man.: 9117,093 94,637 94,637 $4,637 94,637 94,637 94,637 94,637
ContingenciesC5): 9205,879
R.E.Tamow/Const&n.: 960,000 $2,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 02,376 92,376
Financing(1) 962,564 962,564
-----.------------------- w------------------------------------.----------.-------.------...----------.----------......---------.---
Total Empanditurept 0698,813 9581,249 9581,249 9581,249 0581,2-49 9581,249 981,249
ExHIBIT 1 a 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-------------.-. --. --------------------... --.. ---.-. ---------------------------------------------------------. .--..-----------. --...
Construction Loan 9560,764 9568,764 9568,764 9568,764
Acquisition
ArchSEng.C59)s 94,679 94,679 $4,679 $4,679
survey a Testing:
Insurance: 9792 9792 9792 9792 9792 9792 9792 $792
Lega14Accounting: $7,018 97,018 97,018 $7,018
Per.its:
Marketing: 975,000 $75,000 $17,544 917,544 917,544 917,544
Developwent Man.1 $4,637 94,637 94,637 $4,637 94,637 94,637 94,637 $4,637
ContingenciesCS5:
R.E.Taoew/Const&n.: $2,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 $2,376
Financing(12)
Total Espenditures: $561,249 9581,249 0656,249 9656,249 932,367 932,367 932,367 932,367
EXHIBIT 1 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
----------------..---- ----------------------------------------------ww--.-------------------. -----------------------
Construct~ion Len
Acquisi tion
ArchEng. C5):
Survey S Testings
Insurance: S792 9792 9792 9792 $792 9792 9792 $792
LeglsAccountings $7,018 97,018 07,018 97,018 97,018 $7,018 97,018 97,018
Peri ts:
Marketing: 917,544 917,544 917,544 917,544 $17,544 917,544 917,544 917,544
Developpeent Man.I 94,637 94,637 94,637 94,637 $4,637 94,637 94,637 94,637
Contingencim sC52>
R.E.Tmsws/ConstSM.: $2,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 92,376 $2,376
Financing(1M
Total Ewpenditures: 932,367 932,367 932,367 932,367 932,367 932,367 932,367 932,367
-------------. ..---- ...----- f--.--....-..--.------ .---- ------...---- .------..- ft ..------.- ..------... ---f - --. ----. -------.... --------..
.--.-.-..-------.
EXHIBIT 1I
===.--.----......
Construction Loan
Acqui si tin
rcheEng. C):
Survey & Testings
Insuranc:
LegalRecounting:
Peroi ts:
Marketing:
Development Men.s
ContingenciesC52)s
24 25 25.25
.w.------...--------------------------------
9792
97,018
917,544
94,637
9792
97,018
S17,54494,637
9190
91,754
94,38691,159
R.E.Tawes/ConstaM.: 92,376 02,376 9594
Financing(12
Total Ependitur-es: $32,367 932,367 98,092
..-- . .-.---- . ..- ..-- - .---- . - --.-. -. -------...----- ------....
H
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LINCOLN NARF PROFORMA "UNFINISHED" PAGE 6;-; --------------------------------------------..--------.... ;;..-.----..........ENNIBIT FIVE REVENUES FROM PARKING S MRARINR SLIPS Average Sale 530,614
.------------------------------.---------.---------------------------------.........--.----------....--....--..-----.--.......-Mlonth: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cash fro" Sales $122,456 $122,456 5122,456 $122,456 $122,456 $122,456 $122,456 $122,456
LessCoomission(2.52) ($3,061) (53,061) ($3,061) (3,061) (53,061) ($3,061) (53,061) C$3,061)
Cash BeforeFinancing $119,395 6119,395 0119,395 5119,395 $119,395 5119,395 $119,395 S119,395
ENNISIT FIVE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------...------------....-------.-...--.------
Month: 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
Cash ron Sales 5122,456 9122,456 5122,456 5122,456 5122,456 5122,456 530,614
LessCoissio.n(2.5t) (53,061) (53,061) C93,061) ($3,061) (3,061) (53,061) (5765)
Cash BeforFinancing 5119,395 $119,395 9119,395 5119,395 $119,395 $119,395 529,849
------=--.--===----e-...-..--------.------------=-----......--------------- -----...--..------------
EMMIBI7 SIN REVENUES, OFFICES
----------.--------------- .-.. .. ..-----.--. ------...-...............--..-........-----....---..-..
Month: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cash frow Sales 5135,789 $135,789 5135,789 5135,789 $135,789 $135,789 $135,759 $135,789
LssC issionC2.5 (53,35 3,395) (3,395) (3,395) (3,395) (03,395) (3,395) CX3,395)
Cash beforeFiancing 5132,395 9132,395 9132,395 5132,395 5132,395 5132,395 5132,395 5132,395
E)4M181T SIN
--=------------..------------ ---- -- e---- - -----.---.------------------..---------------------------------------
Months 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
Cash frow Sales 5135,769 9135,789 5135,789 5135,769 5135,789 5135,789 533,947
LessConnission(2.5X) (53,395) ($3,395) (03,395) (03,395) <3,395) ($3,395) <5849)
Cash _BforeFinancing 5132,395 5132,395 $132,395 5132,395 $132,395 $132,395 533,099
==-------------=...=.---...-----------=.1.......3 .-...-...--........ ................EIBIIT SEVEN FINANCING REQ.'s,: MARKETING PERIOD INTEREST RAT 12.002
-----------------------------------..--....------------------...-------------------............-. ----..----=-..--......-Monthz 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Seginning Dalance C$7,073,863) (56,296,344) ($5,511,050)(4,717,903)(03,916,824> C$3,107,735) (52,290,555> (01,465,203)
Net Sales Revenues 5872,226 5672,226 5872,226 $872,226 $672,226 5872,226 5872,226 5872,226
Empenditures (532,367) (532,367) (032,367) (532,367) (32,367) (032,367) (532,367) (532,367)
Outstanding Balance (06,234,004) (05,456,485) (94,671,191>C03,876,044>(3,076,965) (52,267,876) (51,450,696) ($625,343>
Interest C62,340) (554,565) C46,712) ($38,780) (530,770> (522,679) (514,507) <6,253)
End Balance C6,296,344) (05,511,050> C4,717,903)(<3,916,824)C3,107,735) C2,290,555) C1,465,203) ($631,597)
-------------w---=.----....-----------------------------------.-----------.-----------.----------- 
----........---.-----EMMIBIT SEVEN FINANCING REQ. 'a:
HonthI 9 10 11 12 13 14 14.25
Beginning Balance (631,597) 5200,262 51,048,121 51,887,980 52,727,839 $3,567,698 $4,407,557
Net Sales Revenues 5872,226 5872,226 5872,226 5872,226 5872,226 5872,226 $218,057
Espenditures C32,367) C32,367) (532,367> (532,367) (532,367) (32,367) (58,092)
Outstanding Balance $208,262 51,046,121 51,867,980 52,727,839 53,567,698 54,407,557 54,617,522
Interest s0 50 s 0 s0 50 s0
E208,262 51,048,121 51,887,980 52,727,839 53,567,698 54,407,557 54,617,522
1-j
(1
--------------------------------- . ............................................ ft.ftft ..............................
End Dal ance
